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THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL  




Introduction: Few studies have focused on the effects of change within a military 
graduate institution where military and academic subcultures coexist.  This research 
focused on the 2001-2002 organizational change at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The 
purpose was to identify how change was approached and implemented, as well to find out 
what happened during the process of organizational change.  The overarching goal of the 
investigation was to understand organizational change in a complex and dynamic military 
educational environment. 
Methods:  Personal interviews with 23 faculty and administration members were 
conducted, tape-recorded, and transcribed verbatim.  Themes were identified using a 
qualitative thematic analysis technique. 
Results:  The themes reflected the impact of the change process on organizational 
subcultures.  Our analysis revealed that this change process implemented across the 
organization affected the intensity of sub-cultural conflict within the organization. In the 
case of NPS, an authoritarian style of change representing a military approach eclipsed 
the existing academic subculture.  We suggest that this is because the change initiative 
represented different fundamental aspects from that of the academic subculture.  The 
pressure of a change effort that was not representative of both subcultures increased the 
intensity of conflict between the military and academic subcultures, which jeopardized 
the ability for the two to work together. 
Discussion: We propose cultural conflict is inherent in the organization and can 
either be positively or negatively impacted as a result of change.  Certain cultural change 
factors are associated with specific indicators.  These indicators reflect the impact of 
change strategy on fundamental aspects of organizational subcultures. These impacts 
influence the intensity of cultural conflict within that organization.  It is important for 
change agents to understand how these factors are interrelated so that the intensity of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
This paper explores the organizational change initiated by Rear Admiral David R. 
Ellison in the fall of 2001 at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California.  This change directly impacted the existing NPS structure in that it 
transformed a highly decentralized institution into a centralized, four-school system.  
Previous to the change, different curricula were grouped into departments where 
department chairs had considerable authority to run their departments or divisions.  
Following the change, related departments were further grouped into schools, and 
decision-making power was pushed to higher levels.  The change also included the 
creation of learning and research centers called institutes that were designed to integrate 
teaching and research, faculty and students, and theory and application.1  The 
departments and institutes became linked through a quasi-matrix structure, which was 
designed to foster both horizontal communication (between departments) and vertical 
reporting (between different levels of management).  The new organizational structure 
and change strategy are shown in Appendix A (p. 88). 
NPS is a multi-cultural institution comprised of military and civilian faculty; 
American students from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; foreign nationals from 
allied countries, such as Chile, Germany, and Turkey; civilian government employees; 
and active duty military administrators.  Within each of these groups are further 
divisions, each with its own set of norms and values.  Norms are defined as a standard 
against which the appropriateness of a behavior is judged.2  Values are qualities that are 
regarded as useful or desirable.3  On the whole, however, the two dominant subcultures 
of the institution are military and academic.  Culture refers to the set of shared values, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of a group, and defines a way of thinking.4  While these 
                                                 
1 David R. Ellison, “What NPS Means to DoD: A View to the Future,” NPS Journal, 
vol. 1 no. 1 (2001): 5-9. 
2 G. Moorehead and R.W. Griffin, Organizational Behavior: Managing People and 
Organizations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 4. 
3 Albert Morehead and Loy Morehead, eds., The New American Webster Handy 
College Dictionary, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books 1995), 718. 
4 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati: 
Southwestern College Publishing 2001), 135. 
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sets of underlying values are different in the military and academic subcultures at NPS, 
the fit between them is important to the success of the organization.5  
This study is highly relevant to U. S. military officers considering the renewed 
emphasis on organizational change by the Department of Defense (DoD) as evidenced by 
the creation of the Office of Force Transformation.6  The recent reorganization at NPS 
provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of an organizational change process 
on the staff and faculty at the Navy’s premier graduate school.  In light of recent events 
including terrorist attacks, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and a rapidly changing global 
environment that presents new and different daily challenges, we believe the 
reorganization of the Navy’s graduate education system provides great value in 
attempting to understand different methods of implementing change during uncertain 
times.  Furthermore, this study reveals lessons and results of implementing change within 
a mixed military/civilian environment in contrast to a solely military command structure.  
NPS contains both academic and military subcultures woven into a military structure that 
yields interesting and controversial questions as to how organizational change can best be 
handled.   
This study was initiated to gain an understanding of the process used to 
implement transformational change at NPS and to explore the ramifications of the 
realignment on those directly affected.  The study was structured to answer several 
fundamental questions.  1) How did the Superintendent, Rear Admiral David R. Ellison, 
approach change at NPS?  2) What led him to make the change and what did he consider?  
3) Did realignment conform to the transformational spirit of Joint Vision 2020?  4) How 
did it effect the environment and culture at NPS? 
The research team conducted interviews at different levels within the organization 
to gain understanding of the impact of change.  The use of personal interviews of those 
present during the change process enabled the researchers to capture representative 
perspectives from within the organization and from its leader (Superintendent RADM 
                                                 
5  Linda A. Hill, “A Note for Analyzing Work Groups,” Harvard Business School No. 
9-496-026 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), 16. 
6 Office of Force Transformation, <http://www.oft.osd.mil/> [13 December 2003]. 
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Ellison).  From these interviews, emerging themes were developed and analyzed.  By 
learning from organizational members what shaped the change at NPS, the reader can 
indirectly observe the dynamic volatility of a multi-dimensional organization undergoing 
organizational change.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.  IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
NPS is the Navy’s primary source of graduate education for its officers and is the 
world’s largest and most prestigious defense-oriented graduate institution.7  More than 
1300 students, including commissioned officers from all U.S. military services and nearly 
50 countries, are currently pursuing graduate degrees.  A fully accredited university, 
faculty at NPS consists of approximately 200 tenure track faculty, 30 military faculty, 
and a varying number of other non-tenure-track faculty who support the teaching and 
research programs.8  NPS specializes in advanced education at the Master’s Degree level 
through resident courses and distance learning, and awards a limited number of 
Doctorates.  The school offers an array of programs for continuous learning and 
executive education.  Academic programs provide a unique interdisciplinary defense 
focus on science, engineering, technology, policy, operations, management, and 
international relations, not available in the private sector.  In the last ten years, however, 
top-level officials in the DoD have raised questions concerning the relevance of NPS in 
the rapidly transforming defense environment.  We propose that this concern coupled 
with budget shortfalls and efficiency efforts placed the school on Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) lists.  Debate over the relevance of NPS to DoD interests has thus raised 
questions concerning the long-term worth and survival of NPS. 
Rear Admiral Ellison faced this concern upon taking the reins of NPS and 
assuming the leadership position as the 22nd Superintendent on September 4, 2000.  Prior 
to arriving at NPS, Ellison served on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and was the Executive Assistant to the Vice CNO.  
He was therefore intimately aware of the negative perception NPS had acquired during 
his tour at headquarters in Washington.  After assessing NPS for himself during the first 
few months of his three-year tenure, the Superintendent became convinced that the 
                                                 
7 “Framework for the Future, Strategic Plan 2003-2005,” (Naval Postgraduate School 
brochure, Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Monterey, CA: 2002), 1. 
8 Naval Postgraduate School Website, <http://www.nps.navy.mil/nps/faculty.htm/> 
[10 December 2003]. 
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institution indeed added value to the DoD.9  This assessment was the impetus for the 
Admiral’s vision to better align NPS with the needs of the DoD.10  The change was 
needed to dispel the perception of decision makers in Washington D.C. that NPS was an 
inward-looking enclave that lacked credible fiscal oversight.11  Unless NPS could 
demonstrate a unique contribution to the DoD to separate itself from civilian institutions, 
Ellison believed that NPS would be shut down.  To prevent this, NPS would have to 
demonstrate its value in a timely manner, and dispel fiscal skepticism and insecure 
financial integrity.12  A brief by the Superintendent providing his frame of reference and 
strategy for the change is included in Appendix B (p. 89). 
Ellison’s vision articulated the need for massive reorganization.13  He proposed 
that the institution transform from an advanced military education facility into a premier 
academic center of excellence in order to properly align itself with the rapidly changing 
world of transformation outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan for the future, Joint 
Vision 2020.   Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared,  
…we must transform not only our Armed Forces, but also the Department 
that services them by encouraging a culture of creativity and intelligent 
risk taking.  We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach to 
developing military capabilities, one that encourages people, all people, to 
be proactive and not reactive.14 
According to Ellison, NPS embodied this approach as “… a leading change agent and 
center of innovation serving as the corporate university for the Naval services.”15  He saw 
the need to offer a context where students and faculty could place themselves in 
preparation for their role in the world of uncertainty.  He also envisioned this 
transformation would embrace new developments spawned by recent revolutions in 
                                                 
9 RADM David Ellison, Superintendent of Naval Postgraduate School, interview by 










business, military, and educational affairs.  Working on advanced concepts in areas 
ranging from organizational management and operational analysis to technology, 
information, and joint warfare applications, the Admiral firmly believed the Navy stood 
at the intersection of these three movements.  In order to sustain its role as a leader of 
transformation, the Navy needed to cultivate a world class, customized educational 
system focused on meeting the challenges and military requirements of the future. 16   
To accomplish this, the Admiral set out to achieve a revolution in educational 
affairs (REA) by realigning NPS and its supporting research programs to achieve three 
goals:  
• Creating and sustaining academic programs that are nationally recognized and 
support the current and future operation of the Navy and Marine Corps, sister 
services, and allies. 
• Developing Institutes that focus on the integration of teaching and research in 
direct support of the four pillars of Joint Vision 2020 and its enabling 
technologies.   
• Ensuring executive and continuing education programs that support continuous 
intellectual innovation and growth throughout an officer’s career.17 
His vision for the future of NPS realignment included the formation of four 
schools within the organization including the School of Business and Public Policy, 
School of Engineering and Applied Science, School of Operations and Information 
Science, and School of International Graduate Studies.  The intent was clearly designed 
to “…provide the academic structure needed by our students to cope with future 
challenges,” and to provide a more understandable structure to civilian academic 
institutions.18   
 
B.  CULTURE AT NPS 
To understand the impacts of the Superintendent’s organizational change at NPS, 
its predominant subcultures and their interrelationship are defined and examined.  Most 
members of NPS fall into either an academic or military subculture.  The faculty 
                                                 
16 Ellison, “What NPS Means to DOD.  A View to the Future,” 5. 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
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generally fall into the former while the administration fall in to the latter.  It should be 
noted, however, that a small minority of NPS members have both an academic and 
military background, and therefore belong to a hybrid group. The Deans and military 
faculty members are potential members of this third subculture.  For the purpose of this 
paper, however, only the military and academic subcultures will be explored and 
developed. 
 
C.  MILITARY CULTURE 
The American military culture at NPS is rooted in the long-standing traditions and 
norms of the U.S. Armed Forces.  In order to fight and win America’s wars, its military 
culture demands discipline, respect for authority, sacrifice, loyalty, and teamwork.19  
Deference to rank and positional power is demanded, despite any personal feelings one 
has for his superiors.  The culture is goal oriented, and centered on mission 
accomplishment to the exclusion of almost all other objectives.  Instant and willing 
obedience to orders is the required norm.20  Tradition, ceremony, awards, and promotion 
structure reinforce these values.  The manner in which the military is organized also 
contributes to its norms and attitudes.  The culture is influenced by the highly centralized, 
hierarchical structure that defines the military chain of command.  This ensures the flow 
of information and decision-making occurs in a sequenced manner that is pivotal to 
ensuring the dissemination of information to those in position to act upon it.  Doctrine, 
standard operating procedures, and formalized processes rigidly channel effort and 
resources to solve problems.  Subservience of self-interests to the welfare of the team, 
unit, or organization is also a fundamental aspect of the military culture.21  These norms 
and expectations are driven into their marks in virtually every aspect of a soldier, sailor, 
or airman’s career, from training to work-ups to deployments.   
 
 
                                                 
19 John Hillen, “Must US military culture reform?” Parameters, vol. 29 no. 3 
(Autumn 1999), 10. 
20 Ibid. 
 21 Ibid. 
 9
D.  ACADEMIC CULTURE    
The NPS academic and military cultures are radically different in many respects.  
The academic culture recognizes research and scholarship as its core values as 
substantiated by observations found by Duderstadt,22 Rhodes,23 and Trow24 in their 
works on non-military academic institutions.  These studies go on to define the academic 
culture in terms of its values and norms.  Emphasis on basic research, a highly 
disciplinary focus, and strong, long-term support for individual investigators are 
fundamentals.  The academic culture values autonomy and the ability to work on their 
own.  Many faculty members seek careers in academia in part because they would have 
no supervisor giving direct orders or holding them accountable.25    Academics are 
generally given freedom to do as they wish, for the most part, as long as they are strong 
teachers, published, and bring in an acceptable amount of reimbursable funding.26  
Reward through faculty promotion and tenure boards reinforces these norms.27    
Specialization, the conduct of disciplined research in specific fields of expertise or 
interest, is also valued among faculty.28  Faculty members are extremely process 
oriented.  The academic culture values traditional, tedious, and meticulous research 





                                                 
22 James J. Duderstadt, A University for the 21st Century,  (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), 22. 
23 Frank H. T. Rhodes, “The University and its Critics,” in Universities and Their 
Leadership, eds. William G. Bowen & Harold T. Shapiro (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 11. 
24 Trow, M. (1998).  “On the Accountability of Higher Education in the United States,” 
in Universities and Their Leadership, eds. William G. Bowen & Harold T. Shapiro 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 37. 
25 Duderstadt, 161. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 64 
28 Ibid. 122. 
29 Ibid, 64. 
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E.  CULTURAL INTERACTION 
Operation of NPS is dependent upon an interaction between these two groups 
with divergent cultures.  The military owns and runs the institution, and therefore is 
responsible for its direction and administration.  The military way of thinking 
consequently dominates the formation of the vision, mission, and strategic direction of 
NPS.  At the same time, the university is dependent on civilian faculty with its associated 
academic culture in order to realize its vision of becoming the world leader in naval and 
defense related education and research, and to prepare the intellectual leaders of 
tomorrow’s forces.30  This relationship is formally recognized by the administration as an 
institutional focus vital to achieving academic excellence and focuses on recruiting and 
retaining outstanding civilian faculty who are leaders in their disciplines.  The faculty at 
NPS seems similarly dependent upon the military component of the school.  NPS 
provides its faculty with facilities and a unique environment to conduct research in 
support of the DoD.  The success of the relationship (prior to the arrival of Ellison) was 
measured by the thousands of graduates that have departed NPS to apply their knowledge 
in support of the Navy and other services, and in the body of faculty-led research and 
projects that have served the U.S. government.   
This symbiotic relationship between the academic and military cultures appears to 
have been effective due to the shared values of commitment to educating military officers 
and serving the United States through conducting DoD-relevant research.  The success of 
this relationship is also dependent on the academic culture accepting the direction 
determined by the military culture.  Equally critical is acceptance by the military culture 
of the academic methodology.  The question, however, is whether the values, norms, and 




                                                 
30 “Framework for the Future, Strategic Plan 2003-2005,” (Naval Postgraduate 
School brochure, Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Monterey, CA: 2002), 1. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A.  TARGET RESEARCH GROUPS AND AREAS 
To achieve an understanding of the change process at NPS, we attempted to 
understand how its values and culture were affected when applying a change strategy to 
the organization.  In examining this change, the team developed an overarching plan to 
evaluate and gather data from three broad categories of participants in the change process 
as derived from organizational change theory.31  These broad categories are change 
strategists, change implementors, and change recipients as depicted in Table 1 (p. 27).   
Change strategists were the visionaries or crafters of the organization’s foundation for 
change.  Change implementors were the change agents, and were responsible for the 
development of steps required to enact the vision.  Change implementors coordinated 
with various parts of the internal organization and managed relationships that defined the 
internal shape and culture.  Change recipients either buy-in or resist the change.  
Recipients’ responses to organizational change determine further actions from both 
implementors and strategists in attempting to accomplish the desired change objectives.32 
 Positions identified within Table 1 (p. 27) indicate formal job descriptions as they 
relate to target groups within the organization.  Change strategists at NPS included the 
Superintendent, Academic Provost, Executive Directors, and staff responsible directly to 
the Superintendent on strategic planning and execution.  These individuals developed, 
designed, and guided the strategy for realignment and transformation at NPS.  The Deans 
of the four newly created schools and the Directors of the three research institutes were 
the change implementors during the realignment at NPS.  Finally, the recipients of the 





                                                 
31 Rosabeth M. Kanter, Barry A. Stein, and Todd D. Jick, The Challenge of 
Organizational Change:  How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It 
(Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 1992), 12. 
32 Ibid. 
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Table 1.  Targeted Research Groups and Areas 
  
Target areas in this study were derived from existing theory as presented during a 
recent graduate level change management class using a text entitled Managing Change: 
Cases and Concepts by Todd D. Jick and Maury Peiperl.33  Key target areas were based 
on a compilation of knowledge, theories and case studies such as “Meeting the Challenge 
of Disruptive Change,”34 “Three in the Middle: The Experience of Making Change at 
Micro Switch,”35 “Implementing Change,”36 and “The Recipients of Change.”37  This 
background information highlighted several key areas, which we were interested in 
investigating.  Separate questionnaires were developed to conduct personal interviews of 
each of the target groups and to better understand the target areas of interest.  Certain 
                                                 
33 Todd D. Jick and Maury A. Peiperl, eds., Managing Change:  Cases and Concepts  
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003), 306.   
34 Todd D. Jick, “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change,” in Managing 
Change:  Cases and Concepts, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston:  
McGraw Hill, 1990), 128. 
35 Todd D. Jick, “Three in the Middle:  The Experience of Making Change at Micro 
Switch,” in Managing Change:  Cases and Concepts, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. 
Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 385. 
36 Todd D. Jick  “Implementing Change,” in Managing Change:  Cases and 
Concepts, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 174. 
37 Todd D. Jick “The Recipients of Change,” in Managing Change:  Cases and 




Target Group Position Target Area 
4 





Communication of vision 
Method of dissuading dissatisfaction 
Creating a sense of urgency 
Strategic methodology 
Buy-in to organizational vision 
Cultural Congruence / internal environment 
Resistance 
External environment 
7 Change  Implementors 
Deans  
Institute Directors 
Communication of vision 
Individual change role 
Cultural/environmental congruence 
Change process approach 
Vision vs. Internal environment 
Resistance 
12 Change Recipients Faculty 
Communication of Vision 
Buy-in to organizational vision 
Cultural congruence / internal environment  





aspects surrounding the implementation of change at NPS interested the team when 
formulating interview questions for various target groups.  Common target areas for 
strategists included communication of the vision, creating a sense of urgency, strategic 
methodology, and methods for diffusing dissatisfaction.  Each area focused on how the 
strategist translated his vision into action, and whether or not he considered different 
methodologies for accomplishing this objective.  In addition, from the perspectives of 
implementors and recipients, we wanted to determine if the change strategists attempted 
to create an atmosphere of excitement about enacting change, or if the change was 
mandated through authoritative control.  Other areas of interest included potential 
resistance, roles in the change process, cultural congruence, and effects on individual 
values, behaviors, and attitudes.   
 
B.  DATA GATHERING 
To accumulate data, interviews were conducted using different questionnaires for 
each target group, eliciting specific information deemed necessary to understand the 
process of change at NPS.  Once the interviews were completed and transcribed 
verbatim, a formal process of inductive thematic analysis was applied to the information 
using guidelines defined in Boyatzis’ Transforming Qualitative Information.38  The 
purpose of the formal thematic coding process served as a foundation for development of 
a model based on informed grounded theory.  Inter-rater reliability (IRR) tests were 
conducted to validate the identification of themes in the transcripts.  
Questionnaires were designed to elicit individual perspectives from target groups 
involved in the change process at NPS as contained in Appendices C, D, and E (pp. 92-
94).  Questions were developed with the intent to gain insight in the targeted areas 
described in Table 1 (p. 27), and designed so as not to lead the interviewee.  The 
objective of the interview process was to obtain an individual perspective of the change 
process.  Therefore, general open-ended questions were created to allow the interviewee 
to discuss issues regarding the change process that were important to his or her own 
environment.  Examples include the following questions from the questionnaires: 
                                                 
38 Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information, (Thousand Oaks, CA:  
Sage Publications, 1998).   
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1. How did the faculty respond?  How did it go? 
2. At the time of the change what were you thinking and feeling?   
Interviews were conducted and recorded with a confidentiality clause to facilitate 
an open discussion in response to the questions.  The study probed into sensitive areas of 
inquiry so particular care was taken to protect participants’ confidentiality.  Upon 
transcription, the participants’ names were removed from the data.  Our goal was to 
garner an open and personal perspective of the organizational members’ experiences 
during the transformation process at NPS, and the organizational environment.  The 
targeted areas listed in Table 1 (p. 27) aided in creating a protocol that would guide the 
interviewee in discussing his or her own perceptions regarding the realignment process.  
Interview subjects were chosen by targeted selection of individuals from the 
change implementor and strategist groups, specifically the Deans, Institute Directors, 
Superintendent, and Provost.  These groups needed representation to gain a clear picture 
of the strategy and implementation of the change process from multiple perspectives.  A 
hand-held tape recorder was utilized to record each interview and assist in accurate 
transcription.  An action research approach was further instituted to ensure validity of 
responses and establish confidence in data accuracy.  The action research method39 
entailed providing each interview subject with a copy of the transcript including 
questions and responses for review.  Interviewees were given the opportunity to edit or 
amend any statement made during the interview to ensure the accuracy and validate 
previous responses.  Most interviewees took advantage of this opportunity, but no 
significant changes were made.  Two follow-up interviews were briefly conducted and 
re-recorded to ensure the interviewee had the opportunity to add to the previous 
transcript.  Overall, the action research technique proved successful as it added value to 
the data and was well received by the majority of the interviewees. 
 
                                                 
39 Bob Dick, “Action Research: Action and Research,” Resource Papers in Action 
Research, <http://www.scu.edu.au/school/gcm/ar/arp/aandr.html>, [11 December 2003]. 
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IV. CODE DEVELOPMENT AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
A.  DATA DRIVEN APPROACH 
Following the transcription process, an inductive method using thematic analysis 
was used to create informed grounded theory.40  The data-driven approach was deemed 
appropriate, as this method allowed the coder to develop themes directly from the data.  
The study attempted to gain deeper insight into perspectives of the resultant change at the 
institution.  As such, the development of data driven themes provided the greatest benefit 
in the development of theory.  NVivo qualitative research software was utilized to assist 
in data management and to facilitate the development of themes. The greatest benefit 
derived from use of the software was its ability to search documents and group data that 
were assigned to various themes or labels.  The process of developing the code book is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1  Developing the Codebook 
 
 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 41. 
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B.  PRELIMINARY CODE-BOOK DEVELOPMENT 
To begin, the entire sample of interviews (N=23) was divided into the targeted 
groups.  From the entire sample, two sub-samples of three transcripts apiece were 
selected.  The subsamples were comprised as follows: 
Subsample 1:  Change Recipients – 3 transcripts (Faculty members) 
Subsample 2:  Change Implementors – 3 transcripts (Deans) 
Change strategists were not used in creating the themes as only four members of this 
target group were interviewed.  In addition, transcripts used to create the code would not 
be considered in the final data set.  Since only four change strategists were interviewed, 
all of these transcripts were important to include in the final data set.  The first subsample 
was examined numerous times and evaluated for common areas discussed by the 
interviewees.41   We focused on the values, beliefs, and behaviors, which were voiced, in 
order to give us clues about what the participant had experienced as a result of the change 
process.  The first sub-sample from the change recipients’ target group generated fifty-
one themes.  These themes were developed from the transcripts using the NVivo coding 
function.  This function categorized them into groups identifying commonalities 
stemming from organizational, personal, or professional aspects of each theme.  After 
this categorization analysis, the themes were reviewed again and similar themes were 
combined to form descriptive themes.  The thesaurus function available in Microsoft 
Word was used to further describe and develop the underlying themes being voiced by 
interviewees.  Finally, the remaining twenty-five themes were listed on chalkboards to 
uncover or expose hidden relationships between themes.  Each theme was redefined and 
analyzed.  The result of this process yielded a total of fifteen themes that surfaced from 
the first subsample.  Upon further development and definition of these themes, a 
simplified format was applied including identification of labels, definitions, indicators, 
exclusions, and examples.42 
                                                 
41 Ibid, 41-44. 
42 Ibid., 49. 
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An identical approach was taken with the second sub-sample resulting in seventy-
five themes, some of which were the same as those found in the first subsample.  The 
consolidating process was repeated for the second subsample, narrowing the total to 
seventeen different themes in the same simplified format as used for the first subsample.  
Next, the two lists of themes from subsamples one and two were compared for 
similarities and repetition, which resulted in the combining of several themes.  Upon 
combining the themes from the two sub-samples, a final set of 15 different themes was 
enhanced by assigning labels, indicators, exclusions, and examples in the final draft of 
the preliminary code contained in Appendix F (pp. 94-99). 
 
C.  FINAL CODEBOOK DEVELOPMENT 
Two of the researchers coded the subsample of the interview transcripts according 
to the descriptions of the thematic categories.  The two separate results were compared 
using a percentage agreement on presence approach in which each theme was evaluated 
by twice the fewest occurrences noted by either coder divided by the total number of 
times the theme was noted within the document, in the following IRR formula:43   
 
Percentage agreement on presence =    
 
            2 x   (    no. of times both Coder A and Coder B saw it present    )       
  (no. of times Coder A saw it present + no. of times Coder B saw it present) 
 
The goal was 80% agreement between coders.  Additional coding directions were 
developed and agreed upon (as listed in Appendix F, pp. 94-99) to facilitate accuracy and 
agreement about particular examples contained in context.   
Three documents from the initial sub-sample were used for additional training.  
Both coders proceeded to code the same documents independently and compared coding 
results as shown in Figure 2. 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 155. 
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Figure 2  Inter-Rater Reliability Test of Codebook 
 
This process fostered discussion and comprehension of the code.  Following the 
coding of the first document, the results yielded refinement of the thematic code in which 
four themes were combined and two additional codes were redefined using the presence 
of themes under a different label.  The same process was repeated on the second 
document from the first sub-sample.  Following this process, an additional theme merged 
and combined completing the development of the final thematic code.  A finalized 
version of the codebook is contained in Appendix F (pp 94-99).   
The preliminary codebook contained twelve themes and was tested against a third 
transcript to ensure agreement at greater than 80% for individual themes before 
proceeding with the entire sample.  This IRR test failed to yield the appropriate 
percentage agreement on all themes.  Documents from the second subsample containing 
change implementors were used to complete the codebook.  Table 2 (p. 33) lists the 
results from the process.  Lack of confidence in organizational leadership resulted in .444 
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IRR.  Despite the lower IRR, the coders agreed to include this theme in the final 
codebook due to the fact that it was coded infrequently (six times). 
Table 2   IRR Test for Validating the Codebook 
No. THEME IRR Score 
1 Lack of Confidence in Organizational Leadership .4444 
2 Loyalty & Assurance in the Institution .7368 
3 Authoritative Positional Power and Control .8571 
4 Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals .8889 
5 Anxiety towards the Process of Change and External Pressures .8696 
6 Lack of Personal or Positional Power .8889 
7 Cultural Conflict .8 
8 Satisfaction with Status Quo .9231 
9 Institutional Process Ownership –Sense of Shared Purpose .8333 
10 Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment .7568 
11 Academic Insularity and Egocentricity .7619 
12 Organizational Inertia .7692 
 
The final sample of twenty-one transcripts was coded by each coder, but included 
data from two transcripts that were also used previously.  These transcripts contained data 
from one Dean and one faculty member, but were necessary to perform appropriate 
analysis of the data set.  Due to the small sample size, it was important to include all four 
Deans in the final data set in order to have representation from all four schools in 
analyzing the data.  These transcripts were therefore independently recoded along with 
the remaining transcripts.  Although this step is a slight departure from established 
practice, the importance of including the four primary change implementors was essential 
in formulating the informed grounded theory resultant of the study of change at NPS.   
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V. ANALYSIS 
The result of the IRR test is shown in Table 3.  The reliability scores for theme 8 
(Satisfaction with the Status Quo) and theme 12 (Organizational Inertia) did not achieve 
the goal of 90% agreement.  These themes, however, did show presence and agreement 
above 70% and thus can be further utilized to understand the data and contribute to the 
development of theory.  It is important to note that these themes do not represent an all-
inclusive list of the values and norms affected, but rather are indicators of those impacted 
as a result of the NPS realignment. 
Table 3.  Inter-Rater Reliability (n=21) 
TOTALS No. THEME 
Coder 1  Coder 2 IRR Score
1 Lack of Confidence in Organizational Leadership 43 51 0.91489 
2 Loyalty & Assurance in the Institution 41 35 0.92105 
3 Authoritative Positional Power and Control 56 47 0.91262 
4 Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals 55 57 0.98214 
5 Anxiety towards the Process of Change and External Pressures 45 41 0.95349 
6 Lack of Personal or Positional Power 9 11 0.9 
7 Cultural Conflict 67 65 0.98485 
8 Satisfaction with Status Quo 10 16 0.76923 
9 Institutional Process Ownership –Sense of Shared Purpose 66 63 0.97674 
10 Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment 122 101 0.90583 
11 Academic Insularity and Egocentricity 39 46 0.91765 





 The transcripts were divided into three target groups including change strategists, 
change implementors, and change recipients.  The groups were then compared to one 
another to determine whether certain themes were more likely to be prevalent in one 
group or another.  Using NVivo software, we generated a report of each theme per person 
and created a table categorized by target group as shown in Table 1 (p. 27).  We 
investigated the possibility of patterns occurring within and across target groups.  As the 
number of participants within each target group differed, the frequencies within each 
group were averaged.  For example, only seven change implementors were interviewed in 
contrast with twelve faculty members.  The averaged data enabled us to more easily 
compare results in order to gain insights regarding responses from respective groups.   
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
VI. RESULTS 
 The twelve themes that emerged from our data signify various perceptions of the 
change process and its effect at NPS.   A description of each follows. 
 
THEME 1:  Lack of Confidence in Leadership 
This describes the perception that leadership at NPS is weak.  It also describes 
perceptions of distrust, doubt, and disagreement with the realignment or vision for 
change. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change recipients. 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change strategists. 
Key example:  “The leadership on campus does not know how universities work.” 
 
THEME 2:  Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution 
This describes faith and loyalty towards NPS, the belief that the institution has value, and 
the belief in the organization’s mission. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:   Least prevalent among change recipients. 
Key example:  “NPS has a lot that it can bring to the navy and the services.” 
 
THEME 3:  Authoritative Positional Power and Control 
This describes negative perceptions of the management or leadership style at NPS, and 
the perception that a top-down approach is being used. 
Highest Frequency:   Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:    Least prevalent among change agents.  




THEME 4:  Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals.   
This describes perceptions of incongruence between the change process and 
organizational goals. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change agents. 
Lowest Frequency:   Least prevalent among change strategists. 
Key example:  “…its [realignment] caused separations that hadn’t been there 
under the old system…” 
 
THEME 5: Anxiety toward the Process of Change and External Pressures 
This describes apprehension due to perceived instability, and additional workload 
stemming from a perceived chaotic state at NPS while undergoing change. 
Highest Frequency:   Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:   Least prevalent among change recipients. 
Key example:  “I honestly don’t know whether or not the change will enable the 
school to survive.” 
 
THEME 6:  Lack of Personal or Positional Power 
This describes the perception of irrelevance or a lack of involvement in the change 
process. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change recipients. 







THEME 7:  Cultural Conflict 
This describes conflict arising due to a clash in academic and military values, norms, 
behaviors, or attitudes. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change agents. 
Key example:  “I didn’t have any good feeling about the military particularly.” 
 
THEME 8:  Satisfaction with Status Quo 
This describes the perception that things were fine the way they were before the change. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change recipients. 
Lowest Frequency:  Satisfaction with status quo was not mentioned by change 
strategists. 
Key example:  “I don’t know why anybody thought it was necessary to realign.” 
 
THEME 9:  Institutional Process Ownership - Sense of Shared Purpose 
 
This describes individuals who felt part of the change process in that they were involved 
in facilitating the realignment either indirectly or directly. 
 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change agents. 
 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change strategists. 
 
Key example:  “…I have interacted…and been involved.” 
 
 
THEME 10:  Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment 
This describes understanding the need to change and remain relevant coupled with the 
perception that the organization is moving in the right direction. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change strategists. 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change recipients. 
Key example:  “The need for change was correctly perceived.” 
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THEME 11:  Academic Insularity / Egocentricity 
This describes selfishness and the showing of little concern for overarching objectives. 
Highest Frequency:  Most prevalent among change recipients 
Lowest Frequency:  Least prevalent among change agents. 
Key example:  “I try to stay insulated from that and stay out of the inevitable 
tension between the faculty and administration…” 
 
THEME 12:  Organizational Inertia  
This describes little propensity to change or inconsequential results/effects of change 
initiatives. 
Highest Frequency:  Occurred most often in recipients. 
Lowest Frequency:  Not mentioned by change strategists and change agents. 
Key example:  “I think life goes on much as it did before.” 
The frequency among each of the twelve themes defined and described in the 
codebook (Appendix F, pp. 94-99) is averaged and evaluated among the three target 
groups as shown in Table 4 (p. 41).  These averaged frequencies resulted from the 
analysis of the data and enabled comparisons to be made between the three groups.  For 
example, change recipients had the highest frequency (2.5 per person) for theme one, lack 
of confidence in leadership, whereas change strategists had the lowest frequency (.25 per 
person) for theme 1.  We propose this particular result is intuitive since the leadership 
consists of the change strategists.  They would therefore tend not to point out 
shortcomings in their own leadership capabilities.  Further outcomes revealed by the data 








Table 4.  Averaged Frequency of Themes per Target Group 












1 Lack of Confidence .25 2 2.5 
2 Loyalty and Assurance in the 
Institution 
2.5 1.29 .6 
3 Authoritative Positional Power and 
Control 
3 1.57 2 
4 Misalignment of Organizational Goals 2 2.14 2.1 
5 Anxiety Toward the Process of Change 
and External Pressures 
2.5 1.43 1.2 
6 Lack of Personal or Positional Power .5 .43 .3 
7 Cultural Conflict 3 1.71 2.9 
8 Satisfaction with Status Quo 0 .43 .6 
9 Institutional Process Ownership – 
Sense of Shared Purpose 
2.5 3.86 1.3 
10 Simpatico with the Vision and 
Realignment 
5.75 4.86 3.9 
11 Academic Insularity 1 .57 1.8 
12 Organizational Inertia 0 0 1.7 




A.  DISCUSSION 
The themes that emerged from the transcripts were reexamined.  The 
Superintendent’s interview was also revisited in order to understand how he went about 
translating his vision into action.  We considered his statements about the top-down 
approach and how he had limited time to cultivate and socialize the academicians.  We 
propose that these statements are at the very heart of the story.44  This led us to consider 
that the changes made at NPS might have impacted the values and norms of the 
institution’s members.  We propose that the change did not alter values, but rather 
                                                 
44 Ellison, interview. 
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impacted them in some way.  Therefore, in order to examine the link between these 
emergent themes and the change process, a thorough examination of the interaction of the 
dominant subcultures at NPS was necessary.  
While some aspects of the academic and military subcultures aligned and 
complemented one another, others worked against each other and resulted in conflict.45  
For purposes of this study, conflict is defined as interpersonal clashes between the 
military and academic subcultures at NPS due to perceived differences in values.46  We 
propose that this discord arose when these values clashed or work processes did not fit or 
work well together.  Its presence during this process is a natural part of the human 
experience, and is especially common in organizations.47  Moreover, a certain intensity of 
conflict is often healthy, in that it prevents stagnation, stimulates interest and curiosity, 
and is the root of personal and social change.48   
We propose that several aspects of the Superintendent’s change process 
negatively impacted the academic subculture as evidenced by themes 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11 
(see Table 4, p. 41).  As the Admiral was a product of the military culture, his 
methodology was consistent with its norms and behaviors.  Consequently, the 
realignment process and strategy were perceived to be more aligned with the military 
way of thinking, and therefore had much less effect on military values and attitudes than 
on the academic ones.  While conflict between these mindsets is inevitable due to 
significant differences in norms, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors,49 we propose that its 
detrimental effect can be mitigated as long as the common characteristics between the 
subcultures are sufficiently constructive.  Further, when a change process affects one or 
more subcultures, the interaction between them is altered which we propose results in a 
change in the intensity of conflict between them.   
                                                 
45 Charles Moskos, “The Culture of Defense,” Parameters, vol. 31 no. 3 (Autumn 
2001), 164-165. 
46 Lisa H. Pelled, “Team Diversity and Conflict: A Multivariate Analysis,” Academy 
of Management Best Paper Proceedings, (Madison, WI: Omni Press, 1994), 2. 
47 Shari Caudron, “Keeping team conflict alive,” Public Management, vol. 82 no.2 
(February 2000), 5-9. 
48 Mary Peterson, “ Constructive Conflict,” Association Management, vol. 25, no.1 
(August 2002), 7-42. 
49 Caudron, 2. 
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The emergent themes indicate that the top-down, authoritative approach adopted 
by the Superintendent was not aligned with the academic culture at NPS.  The 
Superintendent directed the realignment with little input from the faculty and mandated 
implementation in order to achieve his goals as rapidly as possible.  In his opinion, 
There wasn’t time to socialize the faculty, do a lot of cultivating and 
preaching about change, and preaching about culture change. You’re not 
going to change it by having little seminars and talking about culture 
changes and so forth.  It has got to be driven out.  It has got to be driven 
out year after year after year.  We’re driving out the core culture, the older 
culture, in favor of a newer culture.  And interestingly enough what you 
find out happening is, when you put a microscope on some things where 
there’s never been a microscope before, they change. 
For a culture that valued the ability to choose its course, the lack of ownership in the 
process was an anathema.  This was compounded by the perceived lack of a mechanism 
to provide feedback to the school’s leadership.  Several interviewed faculty members 
clearly disagreed with the Admiral’s assessment that NPS must be realigned quickly in 
order to survive, and greatly resented the authoritative nature of the change process. 
These perceptionss surfaced in the themes of lack of confidence in leadership, cultural 
conflict, and authoritative positional power and control.  The pace at which the 
realignment effort was administered also contradicted the deliberate process orientation 
of the academic culture.  Comments such as “the faculty here has less power than other 
faculties” were typical of those faculty members concerned with their relative 
unimportance, and surfaced in the theme of lack of personal or positional power.   
  Other aspects of the change process conflicted with the academic culture.  The 
realignment called for a close examination of existing practices forcing some faculty to 
change the way it normally operated.  The added emphasis on DoD applicability required 
a new definition of relevance. Where faculty had once been encouraged to seek out their 
own sponsors with their compensation tied their ability to secure funding, now the 
administration was telling them there were degrees of relevance.  Most faculty members 
felt they were already conducting research relevant to the DoD, otherwise they wouldn’t 
be receiving DoD funding.   For example, one professor stated, “I think we’re doing what 
we’re supposed to do.  I think our system of forcing professors to go out as entrepreneurs 
and bring in half their funding makes them very much aware of what’s relevant to the 
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DoD and we do that across the campus.”  Nevertheless, the Superintendent began to steer 
the research in a direction that he perceived as most valuable to the DoD and away from 
individual projects.  The formation of the institutes was designed around this concept and 
intended to utilize faculty from disparate fields of expertise to conduct research on the 
most relevant DoD projects.   
In the academic world, however, excellence is achieved in different disciplines 
through specialized research. Being told how to do their jobs was considered 
micromanagement by some faculty members who saw their behaviors of autonomy and 
individual focus threatened.  The themes of lack of confidence in leadership, anxiety 
toward the change process, insularity and egocentricity, organizational inertia, and 
satisfaction with the status quo were consistent with these perceptions.  The effort to 
improve the financial management of NPS also placed certain individuals under greater 
scrutiny.  The cultural norm of independence and autonomy was viewed as being 
violated.  Closer supervision and accountability in the form of audits were also perceived 
as a lack of trust by the administration in regard to the faculty.  The conflict between 
subcultures was therefore escalated.   
Another major aspect of the change process that heavily affected the academic 
culture was the Dean selection process.  Traditionally, Deans are selected by the faculty, 
and are generally people who had established themselves as true academicians with the 
respect of their associates who select them.  Deans in the past were NPS tenure track 
faculty, and were generally worked their way from associate professor to full professor to 
department chair.  The Superintendent broke this tradition when he appointed four Deans 
from outside NPS.  According to his interview, he held the belief that he would never get 
any change in an organization that continued to promote from within, and that continuing 
to do so would promote isolation and stability.  By choosing the Deans personally, the 
Superintendent also insured that the new hires would share in his vision, thus greatly 
increasing the likelihood that the drive for change would be pursued.  All of the new 
Deans had some degree of military background, and none were perceived to have had any 
substantial record of research.  One Dean lacked a doctorate degree.  This directly 
opposed the promotion process valued by the academic culture.  Several faculty members 
made comments similar to the following: 
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“In the academic world, to be a dean is an honor that has to be earned by 
having been a superb professor and then usually a superb department head.  
To bring deans in who don’t have academic records…I mean it’s a joke.  
Then they get to vote on other peoples tenure when they’re not even 
worthy of it themselves?” 
As a result, lack of confidence in leadership, lack of personal and positional power, 
cultural conflict, and insularity and egocentricity were observed.   
 Despite a general tendency of the interviewed faculty to chafe at the top-down 
style of the change process, a majority agreed with the Superintendent’s vision and had a 
positive view on the value of NPS as evidenced by the themes of simpatico with the 
vision and loyalty to the institution.  While this may seem contradictory, it in fact 
highlights that conflict was created more by the way the Admiral went about 
implementing the program rather than its objectives.  A minority of the interviewed 
faculty even supported the methods, indicating that it was “time to reinvigorate the 
place,” and that the “need for change was correctly perceived.”  The data also suggests 
that different schools perceived the change process much differently, perhaps as a 
function of the degree of involvement members had in the process. 
The military culture was impacted to a much smaller degree than the academic 
one.  Though those individuals that identified with a military culture also considered the 
process authoritative, the highly centralized, team-centered, endstate-focused style was 
consistent with their values and norms.  Where the academic culture bristled at structure 
and hierarchy, the military culture appears to find comfort in its familiarity and 
decisiveness.   
 
 
B.  EMERGENT THEMES 
As shown above, the themes that surfaced in the transcribed interviews help to 
demonstrate that a change has occurred as manifest by the intensity of cultural conflict.  
We propose that these themes can be used by decision makers as indicators to help 
predict the likelihood of achieving the organization’s desired objectives.  Further, they 
are clues to discerning which aspects of culture are affected, and may therefore provide 
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insight into mechanisms to restore a more favorable balance.  While a certain intensity of 
cultural conflict is inevitable in this case and indeed healthy in some respects, too much 
conflict will naturally impede the change process.   
We propose that eleven of the twelve emergent themes center on cultural conflict 
directly, and can be further classified as falling into one of four categories of the intensity 
of conflict within the organization.  These categories, which we call factors, are Buy-in, 
Power, Communication, and Resistance.  The remaining theme (misalignment of 
organizational processes and goals) revolves around the perception that one behavior is 
espoused while a contradictory one is rewarded.  Emergence of this theme may be an 
indicator that organizational change process objectives will not be met in the manner 
intended.  The propensity of these themes to describe the impact of the change process is 
central to the development of the descriptive model in the next section. 
 
 
C.  LIMITATIONS 
The frequency data, contained in Table 4, is inconclusive due to a variety of 
factors.  The small sample size revealed high frequencies for certain themes, and low 
frequencies for others within the same target group.  This makes interpretation somewhat 
difficult.  For example, theme 3, authoritative positional power, had an average 
frequency of three per person for change strategists compared to 1.57 for change agents.  
This implies that change strategists have a negative perspective of their own leadership 
style.  Another example is theme 6, lack of personal or positional power.  Table 4 shows 
an average frequency of .5 for change strategists compared to .3 for change recipients.  
This implies that the change strategists, NPS leadership, feel they have the least amount 
of positional power.  The results of these examples are counter-intuitive. Hence, the 
groupings for these themes and target groups were potentially skewed. It is also important 
to note that each group was asked to focus on several areas within their questionnaire 
protocol.  However, based upon the target group, the questions were slightly varied to 
attend to their specific experience.  Each group was interviewed using different 
questionnaires, because different target groups within the organization had different roles 
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and responsibilities with regard to the change process.  Finally, when a theme appears, it 
does not necessarily reflect that individual’s perception.  Instead, the potential exists 
where statements made during the interview represent what interviewee’s heard from 
other organizational members.   
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
VII. DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED GROUNDED THEORY 
The results provided a framework to model central issues from the coded data.  In 
viewing the presence of several themes and the background of the organization, a 
narrative, which summarized the change process and its affect on the organization 
emerged.  We propose that the intensity of cultural conflict changes within the internal 
environment of an organization undergoing transformation.  We also prpose that 
consideration of this is pivotal in determining the effectiveness of strategic formulation.   
 
A.  PRE-CHANGE ORGANIZATION 
Prior to the change instituted by Ellison at NPS, the military and academic 
subcultures interacted under the organization’s pre-change mission and vision as shown 
in Figure 3.  As a result of this interaction, a certain intensity of conflict existed due to 
differences in values, norms, and behaviors of academic and military subcultures. The 
military subculture displayed results oriented, team centered, hierarchical, centralized, 
and structured characteristics in contrast with the academic subculture that exhibited 
process oriented, specialized, decentralized, independent, and individually focused 
characteristics.   
Figure 3  Subcultural Conflict Intensity Prior to Change Process 
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B.  THE MODEL OF ECLIPSING CULTURES 
The Model of Eclipsing Subcultures attempts to illustrate an eclipsing effect of the 
military subculture upon the academic subculture during the process of organizational 
transformation.  We propose that during the implementation of the authoritative, top-
down change process, the intensity of cultural conflict increased as indicated by four 
cultural change factors.  These cultural change factors are power, communication, 
resistance, and buy-in.  We propose that these four cultural change factors are composed 
of the emerging themes found as a result of the qualitative analysis (Table 4, p. 41).   
1.  Power.  We suggest that the emergence of this factor directly involves 
influence within the organization.  Although this factor was not considered when 
formulating our target areas for interviews, the emergence of supporting themes resulted 
in its inclusion as a factor of cultural change.  Sometimes power occurs within the rank or 
position of the individual or group, and is often indicative of the ability to bring about 
desired outcomes.  When perceived as suffering from a lack of power, we found that 
individuals within the organization may feel unimportant or apathetic towards embracing 
the change.  For example, one faculty member stated, “…overall I would say I didn’t 
have much input.  The faculty has, essentially no power here.”50  We propose that by 
empowering and involving individuals at various organizational levels during the change 
process, change strategists can effectively elevate perceived power and potentially 
minimize conflict between cultures. 
2. Communication.  Communication represents the overall free flow of 
information in the internal organization that occurs in both the formal and informal 
organization.  Communication was another targeted area of interest common through our 
interview questions.  Due to its emergence from the data, we suggest this factor is 
important to understanding indications of cultural conflict during change.  The model 
uses this factor to signal the importance of emerging themes that encapsulate the ability 
to freely share information and ideas, especially in an academic environment.  We submit 
that the presence of themes concerning communication provide strong indicators that 
cultural conflict may not prevent interrelationships among subcultures.  However, we 
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propose that a failure to effectively ensure open lines of communication can result in 
divergence of relationships and poor communication of vision to recipients.  For instance, 
one interviewee complained that “…he’s [RADM Ellison] pushed things hard and he 
doesn’t listen to people very well.”51   This symbolizes a closed communication system 
indicative of a lack of consideration of feedback within the formal organization. 
3.  Resistance.  This factor is derived directly from the intent to gain insight from 
several questions posed in the interviews.  We propose that resistance consists of actions 
or intent to avoid or oppose the process and vision for organizational change.  Important 
consideration should be placed on norms and expectations for organizational and group 
behavior when evaluating and attempting to understand how to cope with resistance 
within the internal environment.  Although we feel that resistance is present in most 
organizations attempting to implement change, the appearance of closely related themes 
suggests it is a strong factor signaling the affects of cultural change within the 
organization.  As evidenced by the following statement, “I try to stay insulated from that 
and stay out of the inevitable tension between the faculty and administration…,”52 
recipients have become resistant by becoming more isolated instead of seeking to become 
involved in the process as academic norms would indicate. 
4.  Buy-in.  Buy-in represents the degree to which individuals identify with its 
leadership or organizational vision.  This factor was identified and is common among 
questionnaires seeking to understand the change process at NPS.  Because it appeared in 
themes pointing to both positive and negative aspects, it was deemed essential to 
understanding the intensity of resulting conflict during the organizational change process.  
If proper care is not taken to involve members of the organization at each level, 
individuals will likely not come to believe in the vision for change, and may even become 
resistant, presenting roadblocks within the internal environment.  Thus, as evidenced by 
our findings, the data suggests that achievement or failure of buy-in indicates a loss or 
rise in confidence toward leadership and the vision for change.  For example, recipients 
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responded when asked about vision for hiring new personnel from the outside, 
“…they’ve [Deans] had particularly little influence…they don’t really know how 
universities work.”53  In addition, some responded, “Its time to reinvigorate the 
place…the need for change was correctly perceived” cementing the duality of this key 
factor. 
Figure 4 below, depicts the relationship between the change process, the increase 
of the intensity of cultural conflict, and the four cultural change factors that indicate an 
increase of intensity has occurred. 
Figure 4  Eclipsing Subcultures during Organizational Change Process 
 
 
As the goal of any change process should seek to achieve its intended objectives, 
we submit that its effect on the intensity of cultural conflict must be considered.  When 
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examining the interaction between two subcultures during an organizational 
transformation, varying intensity of conflict may emerge as competition or rivalry toward 
accomplishment of a common organizational objective.54  We propose that by 
understanding the effect this change process had on the intensity of cultural conflict, and 
what the four key cultural factors indicate about the change in intensity, managers can 
minimize the effect change has on the intensity of cultural conflict and prevent the 
disruption of critical organizational processes.  We further propose that change strategists 
are more likely to succeed at transforming and sustaining change within organization’s by 
anticipating and evaluating potential sources of resistance, interruption to lines of 
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VIII. RELATING THE MODEL TO EXISTING THEORY 
To understand what is being depicted in the Model of Eclipsing Cultures during 
organizational transformation, it is essential to develop propositions and relationships to 
prior existing theory.  Contrasting and complementing insights from prior research on 
organizational open systems theory and change management are presented.  A 
preliminary consideration of prior scholarship in these areas provides evidence of cultural 
interaction and conflict present in a myriad of organizations.   Upon review of this 
literature, we propose that a thorough understanding of the function, influence, and 
behavior of organizational culture is imperative to effectively implement and sustain 
change. 
 
A.  ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CHANGE 
Organizational culture is widely viewed as a difficult but necessary aspect of 
managing change.  Culture, as depicted in the model presented in this study, is one of 
eleven dimensions of organizational design.55  As discussed in organizational systems 
theory, organizational dimensions are commonly divided into two types:  structural and 
contextual.  Structural dimensions are focused on internal characteristics for measuring 
and comparing organizations including formalization, specialization, hierarchy of 
authority, centralization, professionalism, and personnel ratios.  In contrast, contextual 
dimensions embody the entire organization including size, technology, environment, 
goals and strategy, and culture.56  They may indicate commitment, behavior, and ethics, 
and are represented as deeper reflections in the minds of individuals that make up the 
organization.57  Those values, or core beliefs, that drive the organization during periods 
of change are largely transparent during daily activities.  When an organizational 
transformation process opposes those basic cultural behaviors and values, the power of 
the existing culture emerges.58 
                                                 
55 Daft, 9. 
56 Ibid., 10. 
57 Ibid., 116 
58 Jick and Peiperl, 211. 
 42
We propose that the objective of a successful change process should generate 
commitment and support of the vision and strategy for change.  Without a belief in the 
organization’s vision for change, change itself can not occur.  Although ideas, processes, 
and even structures are realigned during the transformation, these changes affect the 
values, beliefs, and attitudes of the organizational culture.  The strategic change process, 
as shown in our Model of Eclipsing Cultures, attempts to link organizational objectives 
with the appropriate type of change through the interaction of two organizational 
subcultures.  The two subcultures represented in the data during the study are academic 
and military subcultures.  These subcultures explain the complexity of organizational 
culture that exists in many organizations including those with very strong organizational 
identities.59  Subcultures contain commonalities such as problems, goals, and experiences 
that individuals share.  For instance, military units typically possess strong cultural 
identity sharing numerous experiences during training and operational deployments.60  At 
NPS, the existence of other subcultures helps to uncover the presence of other values, 
behaviors, and beliefs that may shape the organization during change.  Therefore, the 
influence and affect of these subcultures must be considered when developing and 
formulating a strategy.   
To accomplish successful organizational change, we propose that leadership and 
change strategists must consider the type of change necessary in order to achieve 
intended results.  Theory suggests four types of organizational change including 
technology change, product and service change, strategy and structural change, and 
cultural change as shown below in McCann’s model (Figure 5).61  Organizations possess 
“unique configurations”62 of products and services, strategy and structure, culture, and 
technology that if appropriately balanced may translate vision into the desired 
organizational objectives in response to its internal and external environment.63   
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Technology changes refer to an organization’s production process including 
knowledge and skills that when combined with a transformation strategy, bring about 
efficiency and improvement of techniques.  Technology changes include focus on 
methods, processes, and work flow.  Product and service changes reflect the outputs of an 
organization.  Innovations to existing processes or new process creation in response to the 
environment exemplify product and service change.  Strategy and structure changes are 
linked to the administrative domain of the organization.  This administrative domain 
includes supervisory and management positions in the organizational structure.  Changes 
in strategy and structure are designed to impact strategic management, control and reward 
systems, coordination devices and information management.  Top-down, mandated 
change characterizes strategic or structural change while product and technology changes 
are frequently generated from the bottom up.  Cultural changes result from changes in 
values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of individuals within the organization.  Cultural 
change targets a specific mindset or belief rather than a particular technology, structure, 
or product.   
 




McCann’s model depicts interdependence between the four types of change that 
serves as a wedge for leadership to apply its vision in response to needs from the 
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environment.  Therefore, effects present in one type of change are likely to produce 
effects in the others.64  In addition, linkages between these types of change assist in 
understanding and choosing the type of strategic vision and leadership most likely to 
achieve desired organizational change objectives.  Similarly, during the organizational 
change process, the Model of Eclipsing Cultures presents four factors that emerge as a 
result of the application of strategic vision to achieve desired organizational objectives.   
These change factors appear to be interdependent as the effects of change may cause 
overlapping subcultures.  McCann’s model illustrates that culture changes play a role in 
producing change in relation to a given environment.  As developed in the Model of 
Eclipsing Cultures, strategy may attempt to target specific change types in order to 
achieve specific objectives.  However, as the interdependence of these change types tends 
to produce varied effects, myriad factors and themes may emerge in response to the 
vision applied.   
In implementing organizational change, environmental needs and strategic focus 
play key roles in determining the ultimate organizational objectives.  In examining the 
subcultures involved at NPS during the realignment, a brief adaptation of Denison and 
Mishra’s model of the Relationship of Environment and Strategy to Corporate Culture 
(1993) 65 helps to illustrate the potential conflict between organizational subcultures in 
achieving effectiveness.     
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Figure 6  Relating Environment and Strategy to Organizational Culture66 
 
In their model, Denison and Mishra suggest that two factors, environmental needs 
and strategic focus, are associated with four categories of culture.  By achieving 
organizational fit between them, a successful balance may be maintained.  Clan culture is 
defined as one that favors process ownership and participation of employees in decision 
making in response to rapid changes in the external environment.  Clan culture embraces 
involvement of bottom up control and values employees needs first to achieve lasting 
commitment to the organization.67  This strongly resembles the academic culture as 
previously defined and follows closely with data found in interviews.  In contrast, the 
military culture at NPS is closely linked with a mission culture emphasizing a clear 
vision, results, and focus on meeting specific customer requirements.  Through identified 
rewards programs and communication of desired objectives, the mission culture seeks a 
stable internal environment to achieve measurable goals and external stakeholder 
satisfaction.68  Similar to the Model of Eclipsing Cultures, this illustrates the necessity to 
balance external and internal factors when developing the organization’s strategic focus 
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and stated goals.  Finally, consideration must be given toward the flexible and stable 
nature of opposing cultures when directly interacting in the internal environment.  As 
evidenced by data found in this study, an organization that fails to achieve congruence 
between its strategic focus and environmental needs may become unstable,   and 
ineffective,69 resulting in an elevation in the intensity of conflict among its subcultures. 
  
B.  FACTORS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 
The Model of Eclipsing Cultures portrays four key factors that result from the 
interaction of two subcultures during the implementation of an organizational change 
process.   Data and insight gained from thematic analysis and informed grounded theory 
development generated these factors.  These factors included power, communication, 
buy-in, and resistance signifying the emergence of related themes from the data.  From 
the results of the analysis, these factors appeared to signal major themes, or indicators, 
common in individuals undergoing pressures and effects from various types of 
organizational transformation.  We propose that one culture eclipsed the other, stronger 
indications of cultural conflict among subcultures appeared to surface.  As suggested in 
change theory, these four factors provide insight into the internal organization and the 
deep-rooted feelings and beliefs of the individuals who comprise the organization.70 
 
1.  Power 
Power in organizations is largely the result of structure71 and therefore most 
influenced by strategic and structural changes.  Positional power, or legitimate power, is 
present in the organization’s formal, hierarchical structure.  In addition, coercive power, 
or power to punish, is sometimes granted as positional power.  Personal power may be 
expert or referent in nature.  Referent power is generated from personal characteristics 
admired by peers, supervisors, or subordinates while expert power is associated with skill 
level in accomplishing tasks.72  In organizations, power is an intangible force, which 
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cannot be seen but can be strongly felt.  During periods of uncertainty and change, shifts 
in power may occur resulting in departments engaging in organizational politics or the 
process of bargaining and negotiating used to overcome conflicts and disagreement in the 
internal environment.73  Engaging in organizational politics may result in positive or 
negative forces to obtain desired objectives.  Other use of organizational politics can 
result in self-serving activities, individual interest, and later lead to conflict and 
dissonance in the internal environment.74   
The impact on levels of personal and positional power appears to be an essential 
factor in evaluating the affects of organizational change upon internal subculture 
interaction.  During the process of change, shifting of power distribution among groups 
and individuals becomes a source of nonproductive political activity stimulated by 
changes in the informal organization.  These activities appear most significantly when 
core values are affected. As the change process continues, resistance also tends to 
increase when subculture values and traditions are influenced.75   
 
2.  Communication 
The change factor communication plays a key role in formulating change strategy 
to accomplish organizational objectives.76  Present in communication are aspects of 
organizational culture as the objectives of communicating are to inform, influence 
attitudes and affect behavior.77  Thus, as defined in the Strategic Model for Government 
Communication, analyzing situational factors and designing appropriate strategy must be 
considered in order to convey and accomplish organizational objectives.78  The factor of 
communication is interdependent with other factors such as resistance, following similar 
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conclusions from studies that indicate strategic use of communication to address 
employees concerns.  Additionally, anxiety and ineffective communication may result in 
increased resistance to change initiatives.79  Recent studies indicate that in order to 
improve processes while simultaneously meeting the need for employee assurance and 
security, effective communication must be employed.80  As illustrated in the Model of 
Eclipsing Cultures, themes that surface from the study help to reveal the effects of 
organizational change on the interaction of subcultures during this process.  A recent 
study on effective communication suggests eight factors that determine the effectiveness 
of employee communication.81  These factors, shown in Table 2, exhibit similarities to 
themes that emerged from the data examined in this study.  For example, two-way 
communication involving top and mid-level managers indicated responses such as “they 
didn’t listen enough” during organizational restructuring.  This occurrence mirrored the 
presence of the theme authoritative leadership and control in the study of change at NPS.  
Another example that connects communication as a factor of change is dealing with bad 
news.  In communicating bad news during the change process, the organizational culture 
valued this mechanism and it was institutionalized in formal processes and policy.  The 
relationship between communication and culture suggested in Young and Post’s study 
supports the themes of satisfaction and process ownership that emerged from the 
realignment at NPS.  As a result of this study by Young and Post, communication seems 
to focus upon organizational processes rather than products as its strategic target to obtain 
desired objectives.82  This explains the emergence of communication as a key factor in 
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Table 5.  Factors that Determine Effectiveness of Employee Communications 
1 The chief executive as communication champion. 
2 The match between words and actions. 
3 Commitment to two-way communication 
4 Emphasis on face-to-face communication 
5 Shared responsibility for employee communications. 
6 The bad news/good news ratio. 
7 Knowing customer, clients, and audiences. 
8 The employee communication strategy 
 
3.  Resistance 
In creating and implementing organizational change, strategists and change agents 
must expect and be prepared to handle resistance from recipients.83  Five barriers to 
change, listed below, embody resistance during change.  They are useful for 
understanding the emergence of themes that stem from resistance and cultural interaction 
as described in the Model of Eclipsing Cultures.  These barriers exist at both the 
individual and organizational levels and can be linked to change implementation 
strategies.84  
 
a. Excessive focus on costs 
b. Failure to perceive benefits 
c. Lack of coordination and cooperation 
d. Uncertainty avoidance 
e. Fear of loss 
 
These five barriers serve as indications that the change strategy is not properly 
designed to overcome resistance within the organization.  In attempting to accomplish 
organizational objectives depicted in the Model of Eclipsing Cultures, change strategy 
should consider the interaction of subcultures and the impact of the change upon the 
change factors.  For example, during the implementation of change, organizational 
conflict may result from lack of coordination and communication.  Additionally, a failure 
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to perceive benefits may discourage risk-taking and participation due to the change in 
rewards system.85   
Resistance also enters into culture as a normal response of individuals with a 
“vested interest in maintaining their perception of the current state”86 and protecting 
themselves against loss of power or influence within the informal and formal 
organizational structure.  The strength of the factor of resistance indicates the degree to 
which change impacts values of individuals within the organization.  Although resistance 
may manifest as negative attitudes and behavioral difficulties, the actual occurrence of 
this resistance may be simply defined as frustration.  It is important to consider the depth 
of resistance in comparison to the scope of the change facing the organization.  As the 
scope of the change increases, the effects will be broader and deeper on individuals 
directly influenced by the change.  Therefore, as shown in the Model of Eclipsing 
Cultures, resistance may appear within certain localized groups or subcultures as the 
intensity of the change is felt.87 
The factor of resistance may also surface when a change strategy is applied to an 
organization experiencing periods of success.  Relationships in the internal organization 
may emerge as resistance to change if visionaries fail to consider perceived benefits.  
Themes of insularity and egotism, internal focus, arrogance, and complacency appeared 
during the study of transformation at NPS and follow typical attitudes characterizing 
resistant behavior found in other organizations when exposed to changes to 
organizational process.88  The appearance of resistance when imposing change on a 
successful organization is referred to as the Success Syndrome.  This may lead to 
disabled learning in which the organization can not respond to new ideas and fails to 
achieve the objectives set forth by the change strategy.89 
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4.  Buy-in 
The factor of buy-in attempts to capture the notion of shared vision among 
individuals when exposed to organizational transformation.  Capturing this concept can 
take many forms.  One method to obtain support for vision among groups is to employ a 
range of techniques to encourage process involvement from key players in the 
organization.  These include participation, persuasion, incentives, and ventilation.90  Each 
of these techniques contributes to gaining essential support for the change process to 
continue and successfully accomplish its objectives. 
Participation of critical people in the process of transformation may be lengthy 
and seem wasted.  This step, however, is extremely important in achieving overall buy-in 
within the internal environment.  The importance of participation parallels the theme of 
process ownership and empowerment that appeared in the study of change at NPS.  The 
linkage to individual values within the organizational subcultures helps to substantiate the 
emergence of buy-in as a factor of change.  The persuasion technique is used to achieve 
buy-in from individuals who may not be critical players in designing and implementing 
the change.  Appealing to shared values through persuasive tactics helps to ensure 
support for the organization’s core values. Incorporating incentives, both formal and 
informal, present additional opportunities to accomplish buy-in.  Rewards and new 
initiatives or the perception of increased stature within the organization effects individual 
behavior and aligns values and beliefs with organizational objectives.  In the Model of 
Eclipsing Cultures, the indicators of belief and confidence in organizational mission and 
loyalty to the institution seem to embody the effects of incentives on individual values.  
Isolation encompasses separating important individuals who tend to resist the change 
initially, but may be persuaded as the transformation gathers momentum.  Finally, 
ventilation is a technique for coping with individuals who do not favor the change and 
cannot adapt to the new organizational culture.  This approach to achieving buy-in within 
the organization is highly directly in nature and directly affects individual behaviors.  
Themes surrounding this technique that surfaced in the study at NPS included anxiety, 
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lack of power, academic insularity, and authoritative leadership and control during the 
realignment.91  
 
C.  GOALS, POLITICS, AND CULTURAL CONFLICT 
No discussion is complete without addressing the existing relationship of goals, 
politics, and cultural conflict during the process of organizational change.  In order to 
exist, organizational conflict must contain three ingredients:  group identification, 
observable group differences, and frustration.92  In the Model of Eclipsing Cultures, these 
three characteristics are defined as academic and military subcultures, with differentiating 
values of process vs. results oriented, team centered vs. individual, independent vs. 
structured, hierarchical vs. decentralized, and frustration exemplified from themes that 
surfaced from our study including misalignment of processes, lack of confidence in 
leadership, lack of power, and academic insularity.   The cultural conflict represented at 
NPS can be defined as the behavior that occurs among organizational groups when 
participants in one group perceive the other group may interfere in accomplishing its 
intended objectives or expectations.  Organizational conflict indicates that these 
subcultures clash directly or contain opposing attributes.  Conflict can be confused with 
competition, which encompasses rivalry in the pursuit of a common objective, but 
conflict is more closely associated with an impediment to achieving goals.93 
Organizational conflict between subcultures may occur horizontally, vertically, or 
between various levels of the organization as exhibited at NPS.  The reason for its 
existence is especially pertinent in our discussion relative to the Model of Eclipsing 
Cultures.  In the following model (Figure 1), sources for organizational conflict include 
goal incompatibility, differentiation, task interdependence and limited resources.94  Goal 
incompatibility represents the greatest source of conflict in most organizations.95  As 
differing goals of the two subcultures, such as military and academic, the ultimate 
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objectives of each may oppose one another’s intentions.  The result is depicted in the 
Model of Eclipsing Cultures in which this study suggests that one group overwhelms or 
eclipses the other increasing the intensity of conflict.  Differentiation symbolizes the 
differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among subcultures.  For example, 
subcultures with an organization may differ in values, behavior, attitudes and standards of 
behavior and can lead to an increase in the intensity of conflict.96  Several examples 
surfaced during the study and are exemplified in the Model of Eclipsing Cultures by the 
interaction between academic and military subcultures.  Task interdependence signifies 
the dependence of one group on the other for materials, resources, and information.97  
While the academic culture depends on the military culture for institutional structure, 
administration, and organization, the military culture must depend on the academic 
culture to ensure academic excellence to prepare officers for advanced levels of 
leadership in future complex assignments.  This need for interdependence in meeting 
organizational objectives increases the potential for conflict between the subcultures that 
appears during the transformation at NPS.98  Finally, limited resources represent a key 
source of conflict in organizations. While financial needs seem always scarce, each 
subculture strives to maximize its use and consumption of resources in order to attain 
desired objectives. 99   This source of conflict appears frequently in the study of 
transformation at NPS, in particular in the complex negotiation for research funding and 
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In addition to the sources of conflict identified in Figure 1, the rational and 
political models help to illustrate the concept of organizational politics during which 
organizations adapt to accomplish objectives.  For instance, when sources of conflict are 
low, change strategists tend to use a rational approach to decision making in an attempt to 
capture the “ideal” or optimal solution.  Under the rational approach, goals are clearly 
defined, alternatives are identified, and decisions are enacted to ensure the highest 
probability of success.  Rational decision-making features centralized power, control and 
efficiency.101  In contrast, the political model embodies the understanding that multiple 
groups or subcultures contain various goals, interests, and values.  Therefore, power and 
influence are required to enact decisions.  The political model seeks to employ 
democratic, process-driven methods, and debate in order to implement decisions.102  Use 
of a combination of these decision-making processes is required in most organizations.  
The goal of strategists during the change process is to match the best procedures for 
enacting change in the given environment to reach organizational objectives. 
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Figure 7  Sources of Conflict and Use of Rational vs. Political Model100 
   When Conflict is Low, Rational Model Describes Organization  
When Conflict is High, Political 
Model Describes Organization 
 
Sources of Potential 
Organizational Conflict 
 
Consistent across participants Goals Inconsistent, pluralistic within the organization 
Centralized Power and control 
Decentralized, shifting coalitions and 
interest groups 
Orderly, logical, rational Decision Process 
Disorderly, result of bargaining and 
interplay among interests 
* Goal Incompatibility 
* Differentiation 
* Task interdependence 
* Limited resources 
Norm of efficiency Rules and Norms 
Free play of market force’ conflict is 
legitimate and expected 
 
 
Extensive, systematic, accurate Information Ambiguous; information used and withheld strategically 
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In formulating strategy for implementing organizational change, the use of 
political activity must also be considered.  Organizational politics is defined as the 
activities through which individuals engage to acquire, develop, and sustain power in 
order to obtain preferred outcomes where uncertainty or disagreement may exist.103  
Political behavior can result in both positive and negative outcomes.  As organizations 
change and function, conflict and uncertainty are inevitable. 104  Thus, politics is the tool 
for finding the middle ground. 
As a mechanism for reaching agreement during organizational uncertainty, 
political activity bridges the use of the rational and political approach for decision-
making.  Use of politics occurs more frequently at the top of organizations as change 
strategists and implementors face the most uncertainty in making non-programmed 
decisions.105  The Carnegie Model for Decision Making,106 based on the work of Richard 
Cyert, James March, and Herbert Simon, suggests that both conflict and uncertainty await 
change strategists when confronted with organizational decisions.  To further understand 
the operation of organizational politics, consider the three domains of political activity:  
structural change, management succession, and resource allocation.107  These three 
domains closely connect with the realignment at NPS and exhibit many similarities.  
First, structural reorganization is centered between power and authority.  Restructuring 
organizations directly affect tasks and change responsibilities thus impacting 
organizational power bases.  A virtual eruption of political activity follows with 
negotiation and bargaining as new power bases are created.  Second, institutional changes 
such as hiring of new leadership in key positions, promotions, and transfers generate 
tremendous political activity.  Most significant effects occur at the top of the organization 
affecting trust, communication, and cooperation.  Strategists frequently use hiring or 
promotion to strengthen alliances and coalitions by placing individuals closely allied with 
them in essential positions.  Finally, resource allocation decisions cause constant political 
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activity.  Decisions on organizational resources carry the ability to accomplish objectives 
and affect performance, salaries, and available facilities.  Therefore, conflict and 
uncertainty will naturally surround these decisions.108  The Model of Eclipsing Cultures 
depicts the conflict present in the three domains as NPS structurally reorganized, 
reallocated resources, and hired new key personnel.  Themes abundantly appeared 
embodying these three domains of political activity and our model suggests their 
emergence through the cultural change factor levels of power.  The interrelationship that 
appears between politics, conflict, and the Model of Eclipsing Cultures offered in this 
study closely resembles prior research offered herein. 
Political tactics are essential mechanisms for accomplishing organizational 
objectives amidst uncertainty and cultural conflict.  Most organizations operate with a 
moderate level of conflict and must adapt a methodology for attainment of goals during 
periods of change.109  An alternative approach employs cooperation and collaboration to 
gain support for attaining organizational objectives.  In particular, the tactics of 
confrontation and negotiation incorporate collaborating techniques indicative of the 
process of change at NPS.  Confrontation exists when groups in conflict directly engage 
to solve disputes.110  Negotiation, in comparison, uses bargaining during confrontation to 
“systematically reach a solution.”111  Employing these tactics will increase the respect 
between subcultures and enhance the future success of collaborative techniques to solve 
disputes.112  Depicted in Table 3 are negotiating strategies using collaborative political 
tactics described.113  The Model of Eclipsing Cultures suggests a win-lose strategy was 
applied during the change process.  As exhibited in this study, strategists at NPS forcibly 
applied a military culture and “eclipsed” the academic culture by forcing them into 
submission using threats, rigidity of position (“get out of the way or get run over by the 
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train”), communication by authoritative leadership, and by defining the problem as a win-
lose situation (“NPS will die if we don’t change”).     
 
Table 5  Table of Negotiating Strategies 
Win-Win Strategy Win-Lose Strategy 
Define the conflict as a mutual problem. Define the problem as a win-lose situation. 
Pursue joint outcomes. Pursue own group’s outcomes. 
Find creative agreements that satisfy both 
groups. Force the other group into submission. 
Use open, honest, and accurate, 
communication of groups needs, goals, 
and proposals. 
Use deceitful, inaccurate and misleading 
communication of groups, needs, goals, and 
proposals. 
Avoid threats (to reduce the other’s 
defensiveness) Use threats (to force submission) 
Communicate flexibility of position. Communicate high commitment (rigidity regarding one’s position. 
 
 
D.  CHANGE, CONFLICT, AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Two excellent models that encompass various aspects of organizations 
experiencing changes in vision or strategy are Nadler and Tushman’s Organizational 
Congruence Model114 and Michael McCaskey’s adapted by Linda Hill.115  The latter 
attempts to link group Framework for Analyzing Work Groups effectiveness to an 
organization’s context, design factors, and culture.  The model draws close parallels with 
effectiveness in subcultures and similar interactions brought about by changes in 
organizational strategy.  The group’s context consists of strategy, history, political/legal, 
and cultural systems.  These directly feed into a trio of design factors, or group 
architecture, composed of group composition, task design and formal organization.  The 
design factors are interrelated and interdependent suggesting a change in any one will 
evoke a change in the others.  Within the design factors are the specific dimensions that 
appear to be at the root of cultural interaction during the process of change.  In the group 
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composition for example, demographics, interests, working styles, and values shape the 
subculture and influence the way it will likely react during stressful periods of 
organizational change.  In addition, the formal organization contains the structure, 
reporting relationships, and reward systems/compensation that will directly influence 
struggles for political power and shifts in alliances that surface during transformational 
periods.116  Task design, including required interactions, activities, interdependencies, 
variety, and autonomy, heavily influences the organization’s subculture.117  The presence 
of conflict is present in this model because of the need for task interdependence.  Task 
interdependence is defined as the necessity to depend on others for materials, resources, 
or information, raises the level of coordination and requirement to share information.  
Thus, as the requirement for interdependence increases, the level of conflict generally 
follows.  During the change process, conflict will likely occur when failure to agree on 
coordination efforts in the organization118 results in confusion or anxiety during 
communication of emergent requirements or activities.119  This supports similar findings 
illustrated in the Model of Eclipsing Cultures where emerging themes and factors are 
generated as a result of the change strategy employed during organizational 
transformation. 
The Framework for Analyzing Work Groups also parallels aspects of the Model of 
Eclipsing Cultures in that the group culture is composed of similar conventions and 
components.  The shared values, norms, and rituals indicative of group culture apply to 
the organizational subcultures experienced in the formation of the model presented in this 
study.  This model suggests that differing subcultures may become eclipsed by stronger 
subcultures through the implementation of particular types of strategic change processes.  
The same is true of the group culture described in the Hill-McCaskey model.  The fit of 
the design factors based on inputs from the organizational context suggests possible 
incompatibility with the group’s culture, thus producing lower levels of shared capacity 
for learning, poor performance, and group ineffectiveness. 
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In similar fashion, the Nadler-Tushman Congruence Model presents an 
organizational fit concept to obtain desired organizational objectives through task, 
informal, formal and individual factors during the transformation process.  The 
Congruence Model can also be linked to power, anxiety and authoritative control during 
organizational change.  Under conditions requiring a change in administrative structure, 
use of the top-down strategy typifies the organization’s change process.120  This tends to 
create changes in levels of power through shifting political alliances in the informal 
organization, implications of authoritative control in the formal organization, and 
increased anxiety and stress levels within individuals.121  Studies of individual behavior 
support these indications such as the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Instrument derived from 
the Five Conflict Handling Modes122 (see Figure 5).  The modes of handling conflict are 
based on two dimensions of behavior exhibited during situations of conflict:  (1) 
assertiveness or the level which an individual attempts to satisfy personal concerns, and 
(2) cooperativeness, the extent to which an individual desires to satisfy others.  These 
include competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accommodating as shown 
in the model below (see Figure 7).  Competing individuals are assertive and 
uncooperative while pursuing power, argumentative, and attempting to win in every 
situation.  Accommodating symbolizes unassertiveness and cooperativeness, self-
sacrifice, and yielding easily to another’s point of view; it is opposite of competing.  
Avoiding describes an unassertive and uncooperative individual during conflict in which 
concerns are not addressed and issues are postponed.  Collaborating captures both 
assertiveness and cooperativeness and is opposite of avoiding.  Collaborators strive to 
work with others to fully satisfy concerns of both and attempt to identify creative 
solutions to interpersonal problems.  Finally, compromising individuals seek intermediate 
levels of cooperativeness and assertiveness to find a mutually acceptable solution or the 
middle ground in handling conflict.   
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Figure 6  The Five Conflict Handling Modes 
 
During periods of change, individuals interviewed in the study from one 
subculture experienced anxiety and conflict and tended to become more assertive 
exhibiting competitive or collaborative behaviors.  During volatile periods of change and 
turmoil within the internal environment, individuals from a different subculture also 
appeared to display unassertive characteristics of avoiding or accommodating behavior. 
This supports analysis from this study and the Model of Eclipsing Cultures that during 
periods of change, individuals in different subcultures may experience changes in 
behavior mirroring those described in the Five Conflict Handling Modes.  In particular, 
the emergence of the themes academic insularity, anxiety, and lack of power or feelings 
of unimportance supported the unassertive and uncooperative conflict handling mode of 
avoiding.  These findings support the cultural change factors of resistance and power as 





The following is a discussion of our reflections from this study.  These reflections 
serve to illuminate what happened at NPS and attempt to answer the fundamental 
questions that inspired this research: 
1) How did the Superintendent, Rear Admiral David R. Ellison, approach change 
at NPS?   
2) What led him to make the change and what did he consider?   
3) Did realignment conform to the transformational spirit of Joint Vision 2020?  
 4) How did it effect the environment and culture at NPS? 
Our study suggests answers to all but question 3: Did the realignment conform to Joint 
Vision 2020.  Our contention is that enough circumstantial evidence exists to allow us to 
make inferences on each of the research questions posed.  
 
A.  WHAT HAPPENED AT NPS 
Ellison himself answered the questions from his perspective during his personal 
interview123 of what led him to make the change, what he considered, and how he 
approached change at NPS. He stated that he was tasked with evaluating the relevancy of 
NPS when selected as Superintendent.  He also stated that he came to the job with an 
open mind, equally committed to advocating for the continuity or demise of the 
institution.  Ellison performed an exhaustive analysis in the first four months of his tenure 
to investigate what NPS offered, how it was perceived, what made it unique, and how 
effectively it conducted business.  Based on this analysis, Ellison became an advocate for 
NPS, perceiving both its potential contribution to the Department of Defense and its 
precarious position if major change was delayed.  His message was clear: change now or 
perish.  In his eyes, the survival of the institution depended upon fundamental changes to 
the status quo in a timely manner.  In this light, Ellison wasted no time mandating change 
and initiating his plans based on this perceived crisis. Roughly half of the professors 
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interviewed had doubts that the school’s continued existence was at stake.  This evidence 
that a sense of urgency was not established leads us to the conclusion that had a sense of 
urgency been properly established throughout the entire organization, the Admiral would 
not have had to jump-start the transformation through sheer force of will.   
Admiral Ellison was responsible for creating a vision for the future of NPS once 
he identified the need for changing its nature, and the degree of urgency.  He sought to 
cultivate a world class, customized educational system focused on meeting the challenges 
and military requirements of the future.  His strategy to achieve this vision hinged on the 
restructuring of the institution through the formation of four new Schools and the creation 
of three Institutes, with a renewed focus on serving the DoD customer.  The vision was 
vague in certain details, but was clear in that it effectively portrayed a mental picture of 
what its future should look like, and the direction it needed to follow in order to get there.  
There was also a simple quality to the vision, making it easy to understand and follow.   
The Admiral appeared to have an innate understanding of the roles in the change 
process, as evident by his discussions regarding past change theory versus current change 
theory.  He also recognized early in the process that a strong group of change agents was 
required to ensure that his vision was enacted.124  In order for this change to move faster 
and easier, the change strategist, Ellison, selected individuals that would execute his 
wishes and take on the role of change implementors.  From his perspective, the most 
critical of these agents were the Deans of the schools and institutes, selected for both their 
military and academic backgrounds, and their similar beliefs about the impending fate of 
NPS if something did not change quickly.  Admiral Ellison placed tremendous 
importance on bringing in “new blood” in order to encourage new ways of thinking.  We 
submit that these selections showed excellent fit with the Admiral’s vision for the school. 
To better serve the needs of the DoD he placed military minded people from outside the 
school (GSOIS excepted) rather than pure academics into positions of authority.  We 
propose this ultimately undermined the values of the academic culture by short circuiting 
their cherished promotion process.   This also indicates that the Superintendent was 
attempting to drive out the old culture.  The new Deans were given more power than their 
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predecessors to shape their schools in the way they saw fit.  However, this empowerment 
was only given after the Admiral saw what the vision for their school was, what their 
specific strategic plan was, and then approved it.  This appears to have resulted in 
restrained power and authority to carry out these plans as they saw fit as evidenced by 
statements from the transcripts. 
We were unable to discern whether the realignment conformed to the 
transformational spirit of Joint Vision 2020.  This is because after reviewing faculty 
transcripts regarding this specific question from the faculty questionnaire (Appendix C, p. 
92), it was determined that 66.67% of faculty members interviewed were unfamiliar with 
the document.  This resulted in little to no data that could substantiate an answer to this 
question.  It is our opinion however, that NPS is aligned with Joint Vision 2020 as 
evidenced by the establishment of institutes whose purpose is to integrate faculty and 
students in order to work on advanced concepts and capabilities.  This integration is 
meant to ensure that U.S. forces remain dominant across the full spectrum of military 
operations as called for in the Joint Vision 2020 document.125 
In answering the question of how the change affected the environment and culture 
at NPS, evidence suggests that faculty in each school viewed the new appointments of 
Deans differently from one another.   For example, faculty from SIGS felt that they were 
active participants in the selection of their Dean, as the Superintendent approved their 
recommendations.  But this perception of process ownership only exists because the 
faculty from SIGS saw that the painful process of change was inevitable.  Armed with 
this insight, they decided to get out ahead of the change and submit proposals they felt he 
would approve.  One SIGS faculty member stated that though they were never actually 
told the reason why the change was happening, they knew it was going to happen.  So 
their belief was that if they came up with a preferred solution, and handed it to the busy 
policy maker, he would most likely take it.  Their goal was to minimize damage that they 
perceived would be done by the change.  In this way they were able to choose their Dean 
and avoid what had happened to GSOIS where the Admiral replaced the school’s 
nominee for Dean. 
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It is our belief that while Rear Admiral Ellison communicated his vision on 
several occasions, including an all hands Superintendent’s Guest Lecture (SGL); much 
more could have been done to institutionalize it at the lower levels.  While some 
professors had a good understanding of what the Admiral was hoping to accomplish, the 
interviews indicate that the majority of faculty members did not know why the change 
was taking place.  In fact, some faculty members were clearly skeptical about the motives 
behind the change and believed strongly that the transformation was unnecessary.  As 
indicated by several professors, half of their compensation was a result of soliciting 
research work from the DoD.  They also indicated the belief that they were serving their 
customer appropriately and that DoD focus was already effectively institutionalized.  
Only one professor said that the Admiral spoke with them personally about why the 
change was necessary.  Therefore we submit that a breakdown in communication clearly 
existed as the word from above appears to have been ineffectively passed to those most 
responsible for making the change take place and “stick.”  
This lack of communication between the Superintendent and faculty can be 
partially explained by the Admiral himself.   He perceived the situation at NPS as dire 
enough that the traditional process of bringing everyone together to voice their opinions 
and to create buy-in would take far too long.  In his opinion, change was needed 
immediately, and valuable time would be wasted convincing people that a change that 
was going to happen anyway was in the organization’s best interest.  The issue can also 
be framed using Peter Senge’s application of mental models, which describes the deeply 
held internal images of how the world works.  These images can limit all of us familiar 
ways of thinking and acting.126   For instance, the faculty at NPS is composed of highly 
intelligent academics spread across diverse fields of study and curricula, each with deeply 
ingrained beliefs of how the world works.  Their professional background, experience, 
culture, values, and overall way of doing things colored their individual perspectives and 
makes breaking their mental models extremely difficult.  We submit that if Ellison’s view 
of urgency was correct, avoiding the daunting task of breaching these strongly held 
mental models was appropriate.  Conversely, Ellison’s own mental model of what is best 
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for NPS in the future may also be incomplete.  By failing to consider input of the groups 
most responsible for implementing change, as well as those closest to the transformation 
effort, he failed to capitalize on years of experience possibly resulting in a loss of 
valuable insight. 
Once again, the Superintendent gave his Deans considerable leeway in instituting 
his vision as long as he approved of their strategic plan.  Because the Admiral pursued an 
accelerated process, obstacles to change, such as the former Deans, were removed.  Most 
professors, however, felt that their jobs were unaffected, and that their roles remained the 
same despite the transformation process.  Almost every professor commented on the top 
down nature of change implementation, where realignment was mandated and there was 
no choice or input in the matter.  Therefore a perceptions of lost autonomy rather than 
empowerment resulted.   
Overall, it is our contention that Rear Admiral Ellison and his change 
implementors forced and executed the steps necessary to transform NPS.  That said, there 
appears to be a gross misalignment of long-term goals as evidenced from the themes.  
The Admiral’s vision of military relevance and academic excellence are diametrically 
opposed.  We suggest that this institution will not reach the long term goals of military 
relevance and academic excellence set by the Admiral because in order for there to be 
academic excellence, one must have civilian faculty who are leaders in their disciplines.  
These disciplines are not always aligned with the DoD-relevant issues the Admiral 
believes are important.  In order for NPS to remain a place of learning where human 
potential is transformed and shaped, wisdom of academic culture is passed from one 
generation to the next, and new knowledge that creates our future is produced, it is 
important for scholarship and teaching to remain a top priority.127  That being said, the 
quality and commitment of the faculty determine the excellence of the academic 
programs at NPS.128  By forcing faculty to conduct research in areas that are solely 
relevant to the DoD, the Admiral is in effect steering faculty away from academic 
excellence that requires discipline specialization. 
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Looking back at the overall transformation effort at NPS, certain aspects of the 
organizational structure coupled with individual personalities led us to believe that the 
change may not endure once Admiral Ellison turns over his command.  Additionally, a 
new and extremely relevant question surfaced during our study.  Was NPS indeed in 
danger of dying?  We have not been able to answer this question because we have been 
unable to interview top-level Navy officials who could verify or dispute the Admiral’s 
perception.  The fact that he worked so closely with top decision makers in Washington 
makes him the resident expert regarding their mindset prior to his arrival at NPS.  We 
therefore make the assumption that Admiral Ellison’s perception that NPS was dying is 
correct though this remains unverified.  We believe however, the answer to this question 
provides the key to ultimately determining whether the Admiral’s change process was 
indeed the optimal approach.  If NPS was not in danger of dying, the change process 
implemented at this institution defies everything we have learned is required for change 
to be successful and sustainable.  From translating vision into action through effective 
communication, achieving buy in through means of ensuring a high level of process 
ownership, or applying the Ten Commandments129 of implementing change, it is clear 
that many of these processes were ignored because of the Admiral’s belief that there 
wasn’t time to incorporate these tactics into his strategy. It is arguable that regardless of 
the perceived crisis, these elements of the change process are critical to effectively 
implementing a change that will result in the realization of his vision and long-term 
goals.   
Knowing the perception decision makers in Washington D.C. held regarding NPS 
coupled with his own perception regarding the nature of the academic culture, was there 
any other way he could have implemented the change as quickly as he did?  Arguably, 
much of the “foot dragging” that appeared to exist as a result of the change process could 
have avoided if Ellison had conducted an extensive Appreciative Inquiry.  An 
Appreciative Inquiry is a cooperative process to change that focuses on valuing what’s 
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been effective for an organization in the past; the best of ones organization.130  The 
process is meant to enhance well-being in the workplace, as well as give life to and 
sustain the organization during change.131  For instance, the Dean of GSBPP conducted a 
reduced version of a weeklong Appreciative Inquiry for his school.132  He started with a 
faculty offsite and gave a talk to the faculty in order to give them his thoughts on what it 
was he had observed about them and about the school.  He stated that he asked them to 
participate in an exercise to talk about themselves and see where they were going.  He 
then proceeded to form task forces charged with developing a strategic plan, addressing 
the organizational component of the school, outlining what the function of the 
administrative leadership should be, and developing performance and work expectations.  
Through conducting an Appreciative Inquiry, the Dean took steps derived to instill and 
infuse value in the change process itself using faculty from inside the organization.  The 
Superintendent did form task groups to develop similar plans, but he did this by using 
only staff members.  In doing so, he did not allow for existing faculty members to bring 
out “ghosts” that existed at NPS.  Therefore, faculty members were unable to voice what 
they liked or disliked about the institution.  The counterargument to this is that if the 
Admirals perception was appropriate, and NPS was in danger of being closed, the 
Superintendent’s approach was correct.  In that case, using a top-down approach is 
appropriate because as the top manager, he has the responsibility to direct the change. 133  
However, it appears the academic culture, for the most part, did not share in his 
perception of an existing crisis.  We believe that though this is an important aspect of 
successful change, it is not surprising since the Admiral was not concerned with 
establishing a sense of urgency to begin with.    
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Upon further examination of the transcripts, we submit that the Deans at NPS are 
caught in the “middle space” that pulls them between the administration and the 
faculty.134  On one hand the priorities of the Superintendent’s staff does all its work 
focused upwards and then push the requirements down while purely focusing on the 
outcome.  On the other hand, faculty pushed their demands up and the Deans end up 
being caught in the middle assuming the role of a traffic cop.  Applying Barry Oshry’s 
“Converting Middle Powerlessness to Middle Power: A Systems Approach”135, the 
Deans are effectively disempowered.  This disempowerment is amplified by the fact that 
there are no formalized duties and responsibilities for the Deans and the fact they are not 
provided a staff of their own.  This results in a system where the Deans are very 
responsible, but lack real authority to implement changes or carry out tasking because 
they have not been given the resources.  We see this as a real flaw in the organizational 
structure.  
Finally, it is our belief that the failure to capture the hearts and minds of the 
faculty by effectively diffusing dissatisfaction may ultimately prove to be the difference 
between eventual success, or failure of the Superintendent’s vision.  While Ellison clearly 
felt a need for change based on his own dissatisfaction, it appears, at least at this time, 
that he failed to effectively diffuse dissatisfaction throughout the entire organization.  
“When leaders jump directly from being dissatisfied to imposing new operating models, 
they fail to generate any real commitment to change.”136   Top-down commands are the 
norm in any military organization.  However, Ellison was not dealing with a typical 
military organization.  The mandated changes implemented from top management 
violated the notion of free choice among many faculty members.  Many of the faculty 
members interviewed lacked a sense of ownership of the change process itself.  This 
perceived lack of ownership on behalf of the faculty ultimately impedes their choice to 
adopt new behaviors required to make lasting change successful.137   
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Though the Superintendent’s perception that there was no time to convince people 
of the necessity for change may be correct, the apparent skepticism on behalf of certain 
faculty members about his motives indicates a high probability that an unhealthy level of 
cultural conflict exists.  To date, it would appear this level of conflict persists, thus the 
approach to the implementation process borders on failure to build trust and confidence 
within the organization.  Though not a change objective, the existence of a lack of trust 
and confidence only serves to amplify the level of unhealthy conflict present due to the 
forced nature of the change. The majority of faculty interviewed failed to perceive an 
urgent and obvious need for change, with many perceptions emphasizing that no “real” 
change has occurred at all. 
When applying Bert A. Spectors’ “strategies for diffusing dissatisfaction”138 to 
the change efforts analyzed at NPS, it was apparent that the sharing of competitive 
information was a weak link.  By failing to properly disseminate pertinent information to 
lower levels of the NPS organization, it would appear that the Admiral failed to achieve 
maximum buy-in. Since the faculty we interviewed did not buy-in to the need for change, 
coupled with the lack of a sense of urgency, does not mean the Superintendent failed in 
his attempts to implement change.  It does imply, however, that his changes may not be 
permanent and therefore his vision for NPS may not ultimately be realized.   
 
B.  WHAT NOW? 
During the change process, NPS endured a volatile internal environment brought 
about as a result of structural realignment, and increased subcultural interaction.  This 
caused an increase in the intensity of conflict between subcultures that must be fully 
considered by the new administration.  By slowing down the process of continuous 
change, an operational pause would allow the changes that were instituted under RADM 
Ellison to catch up with the organizational processes at work.  A complete standard 
operating procedures (SOP) manual and a concise formal organization must be defined to 
Additionally, actions should be taken to re-engage the faculty in the organizational 
operations of NPS.  For example, the faculty council has virtually disintegrated and must 
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once again be empowered and encouraged to ensure faculty participation.  Without this 
participation, the new administration will lose an incredible resource by which to 
accomplish its organizational objectives.   
The next step should encompass the empowerment of Deans.  Although they were 
given some freedom to develop the new strategy for their respective schools, they were 
given little power over true decision-making.  As one Dean mentioned, responsibility was 
delegated, but without the authority to accomplish the objectives.  Finally, the new 
administration should attempt to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence. 
During a crisis, there is no room for democracy due to the time-consuming nature 
of consensus.  An administration must exercise firm, decisive leadership to successfully 
implement the process of transformation within time constraints.  Now that the first stage 
of the change process has taken effect, it is essential to regroup and build consensus and 
support from the recipients, and truly empower the change implementers.  Key players 
within the informal organization must also be brought in using methods of persuasion or 
collaboration as described in this study.  By empowering and rejuvenating the informal 
organization and clarifying formal organizational processes, the new administration can 
take positive steps toward sustaining the momentum for change and reaching intended 




 Based on the data collected from our study, we propose that change processes 
implemented across an organization ultimately affects subcultures and the intensity of 
cultural conflict between them.   In the case of NPS, forced change negatively impacted 
the existing academic culture in that it opposed the fundamental aspects of that culture.  
We propose that this resulted in an increase of the intensity of cultural conflict between 
the military and academic cultures that must work together in order to provide both 
military relevance and academic excellence. 
The Model of Eclipsing Cultures was created from 12 emergent themes found 
throughout twenty-three interviews.  These themes helped paint a picture of how the 
intensity of cultural conflict present in any organization can be positively or negatively 
impacted as a result of change.  This model goes on to provide a visual explanation of 
how certain cultural change factors embody specific indicators.  We propose these 
indicators reflect the impact of change strategy on fundamental aspects of organizational 
subcultures.   
Future research should attempt to consider several pertinent areas of inquiry, 
which emerged from our study.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Do qualities of a change process that oppose fundamental aspects of a given 
organizational sub-culture, result in an increase in the intensity of cultural conflict within 
that organization? 
 
Sub Research Questions 
1.  If themes emerge that exhibit high levels of resistance during organizational 
change, do low levels of buy-in, power, and communication exist? 
2.  If themes emerge that exhibit low levels of power during organizational 
change, does this mean that an increase in the level of resistance coupled with a 
low level of buy-in exist? 
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3.  If themes emerge that exhibit a high level of communication during 
organizational change, does this mean a low level of resistance coupled with a 
high level of buy-in exist? 
4.  If themes emerge that exhibit a high level of buy-in during organizational 
change, does this mean that a high level of communication and power coupled 
with a low level of resistance exist? 
 
From this study we were able to create a theory that contributes to the 
compendium of organizational change and developed literature. Interesting to our final 
analysis was finding that through the process of developing our own theory, we actually 
helped to substantiate existing theory that has been primarily deemed highly relevant to 
organizational change scholarship.  It is our belief that this further affirmation of theory, 
combined with new areas for research inquiry, creates exciting avenues for future 
investigation.  Additionally, we believe that we have provided an important investigation 
that helped to describe what happened at NPS during the transformation.  This 
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APPENDIX C.  CHANGE RECIPIENTS QUESTIONNAIRE 





Do you know what Joint Vision 2020 is?  If so, please describe. 
 
Was the change congruent with the environment and culture at NPS?   
 
If not, why? 
 
Has the realignment affected the values of the faculty at NPS?  If so how?  If not, why? 
 
Has the realignment affected the values of the students at NPS?  If so how?  If not, why? 
 
Do you think change has occurred at NPS? If yes, what tells you that change has 
occurred? 
 
Do you think that the institution  has reorganized? If yes, is that the main feature of the 
change?   
 
Did you experience a change in your role as a faculty member?  If yes, can you describe 
this please? 
 
At the time of the change, what were you thinking and feeling? 
 
Were you a part of the process? 
 
What do think is necessary in the future for NPS to survive as a valuable asset while 
fitting into the unique structure and culture of DoD?   
 
What other thoughts do you have about your experience as a member of an organization, 
as you were present during this process?   
 
 
*For us to consider……..According to those you’ve interviewed, is the Superintendent’s 
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Why do you think you were selected as Dean?   
 
 
What do you think your role is in transforming the organization? 
 
 
What direction, if any, were you given from the Superintendent or anyone else?   
 
 
How did you proceed in creating the change within the organization? 
 
 
Was this change congruent with the environment and culture at NPS?   
 
 
What did you hope for as you unveiled your plan to the faculty?  
 
 
How did the faculty respond?   How did it go? 
 
 
How would you grade the progress of realignment and transformation at NPS to date? 
 
 
Has the change impacted cross-institutional relationships? 
 
 
Has the realignment impacted institutional values or the culture at NPS?  How? 
 
 
Given that NPS is a non-traditional academic institution, what would it look like to you if 
we were completely successful?  What would it take to get there, and is it compatible 
with survivability?  
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APPENDIX E.  RADM ELLISON QUESTIONNAIRE 
The following questions will function as the basis of the interview.  These questions are 
designed to gain a broad understanding and appreciation of the situation before, during, 
and after change occurred here at the Naval Postgraduate School.  It is vital to 
comprehend the leader's feelings, expectations, and vision when undertaking such a task.  
In response to the answers provided to these questions, additional points may warrant 
clarification and/or follow-up questions in order to gain a clear understanding from a 
strategic decision maker's point of view. 
 
I.  Background: 
a. What led you to realize that a change was necessary at NPS?   
 
 
b. Think back to when this came about.  What was happening at the time in the Navy, 
DoD and here at NPS?   
  
 
II. Change Agents: 
a. Upon your decision to begin the change process, who did you select as your change 
agents, i.e. who was the team that you chose to make this happen and why did you choose 
them?   
 
 
b. What guidance did you give them, if any? 
 
 
III. The Process 
a. How did it go? What happened?   
 
 
b. How did you know this, what represents this outcome to you? 
 
 
IV. Now and the future. 
a. After beginning this journey, what is your perception of NPS now?   
 
 
b. What is necessary in the future to keep NPS aligned with DoD transformation and the 
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APPENDIX F.  THEMATIC CODE 
THEME DESCRIPTION 
Definition:  Weak leadership, distrust, doubt, skepticism of future, unhappy with 
institutional processes, disagreement with realignment and vision for change.  
Leadership often undermines or circumvents the change process. 
Indicators:  Feelings of cynicism, doubt, non-support, exhibits disrespect or 
displeasure with higher authority, not representative of majority, incompetence 
in leading an institution, lack of academic experience, unsure of extent of 
authority, the voice of the faculty not represented, “…the vision is probably 
going to change anyway with the next Admiral,” “wait out the Superintendent.”   
Disagreement with the vision and realignment. 
Exclusions:  Leadership concerns external to NPS and its perceptions of value, 
significance. 
1 





• Poor leadership 
• Weak 
• Incompetent 
Examples:  “The civilian leadership on the campus has been poor in the last 10 
years…”  lack of any academic or research experience 
“they’ve had particularly little influence,”  “they don’t really know how 
universities work,” “the people that have been chosen are not capable.”   
“…we’ve got weak academic leadership.” 
Definition:  Faith and loyalty towards organization.  Believes in the future 
success of the institution and sees value in what the organization represents.  
Focuses on the value of the institution both as an academic entity and to the 
military.  Identifies with the inherent purpose of NPS, i.e. its mission.   
Indicators:  Optimism, pride, and a positive outlook for the future of the 
institution.  Communicates  personal perception of institutional worth, meaning, 
and significance. Believes Navy or Washington leadership lacks understanding 
or awareness concerning false perceptions of NPS, its purpose and its value. 
Exclusion:  Agreement with the vision for change and success of realignment, 
faith in leadership. 
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Examples:  “… NPS has a lot that it can bring to the navy and the services.”  “I 
think the institute is enormously valuable” “…I think its very important to have 
a solid graduate program in the military.”  “…Convince the navy of the value of 
this institution to the navy.”  “I think the pieces are there for a strong future.” 
Definition:   Negative perspective on management or leadership style, micro-
managing, too involved in lower level decision making, controlling, centralized, 
complete control from the top.   
Indicators:  Forced change, failure to listen or accept feedback, micro-manager, 
strong personality. 
Exclusion:   Not in reference to decision-making or personal attacks. 3 








Examples:  “…getting down to too low a level inside the school.” “…too 
detailed a level of involvement.”   “…injects himself in too many decisions.”  
“He never collaborates with people.”  “…he’s pushed things hard and he doesn’t 
listen to people very well.”   “He is always in this send mode instead of receive 
mode.”  “not a very good listener.”    “…forced [change] on the organization.” 
Definition:  As a result of the realignment, actions are incongruent from 
organizational goals.  Incentives are misaligned - discourages working together 
on research/curriculum and project development.  Structural in nature, causes a 
unintended divergence in academic relationships  
Indicators:  Vision fails to achieve its desired outcome due to poorly developed 
processes, compensation structures and interference with internal relationships.  
Organizational processes are not aligned with desired outcomes.  Separation of 
functions added by new four-school system drives a wedge between academic 
departments and programs.  Perceived interference with academic freedom to 
work with other departments on projects and research.  Certain courses only 
offered to certain students, no communication between curriculums and schools. 












Examples:  “…the school is in certain state of internal turmoil…”   “we were 
grouped with the wrong set.”    “...business school is kept separate from the 
others.”   “…the business school… was an example of a restructuring that 
produced bigger divisions…”   “…it’s [realignment] caused separations that 
hadn’t been there under the old system…”    
 86
Definition:  Apprehension toward the chaotic state of the institution while 
undergoing change such as organizational instability and additional workload. 
Uncertainty, future implications, continuous changeover of leadership, external 
pressures and expectations causes instability.   
Indicators  Expresses feelings of uneasiness, threatened, or worried.  Any 
instance of refusal to directly address a question.  Look for references to 
survival, unreasonable expectations or pressure from external sources and 
stakeholders.  Believes Navy or Washington leadership lacks understanding or 
awareness concerning false perceptions of NPS, its purpose and its value.  
Conveys feelings of discomfort regarding change or too much change, additional 
workload or hassle, and loss of academic or institutional value.  References to 
BRAC, negative feelings toward recent “DoD transformation” initiatives. 
Exclusion:  These people are not confused by the new organization or disagree 
with the vision, they are reasonably apprehensive about the effects on the 






Anxiety toward the Process  
of Change and External 
Pressures 
 








Examples:  “I honestly don’t know whether or not the change will enable the 
school to survive..”   “concern within parts of the campus”  “state of turmoil”  
“…can we survive this BRAC process?”  “The new Superintendent will likely 
bring additional change upon arrival.”  “centrifugal forces of worry.” 
Definition:   Feelings of irrelevance, never asked, responsibility without 
authority, little freedom to operate, feels pressure from above and below due to 
lack of positional and personal power 
Indicators:  Convey feelings of lack of involvement in decision-making process, 
lack of  empowerment or unimportance.  Specific mention of lack or loss of 
power.    
 
Exclusion:  Lacking faith in institutional leadership.   
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• No authority 
Examples:   “…overall I would say I didn’t have much input.”   “The faculty 
has, essentially no power here.”   “At the navy school, the faculty have less 
power than other faculties,”  “stuck in the middle” 
 
 
Definition:  Conflict arising in either the external or internal environment in 
which NPS, academic and military values clash, differences appear in values and 
goals, or methodology does not fit or work well together.   
Indicators:  differing views of educational responsibility.  Value based not 
structurally based.  Use of “they” (for military) and “we” as academics.  Mention 
of “the Mezzanine” or “Mezzanine leadership, “Us versus them,” Academic 
values are not respected as compared to other institutions.   






• Military vs. academic 
• Mixed culture 
• “Mezzanine” 
Examples:   “…I didn’t have any good feeling about the military particularly.”   
“There is not one culture at NPS.  There are three cultures.”   “…you’ve got 
three things, three entities, there’s friction between them.”   “The Navy 
thinks….but the academic culture thinks...” 
“…the case in the academic world…”   “another whole level of management on 
the mezzanine.” 
Definition:  Happy with the way things are, things are fine.  Individual embraces 
the pre-change climate.  Lacks a sense of urgency to enact any change or resists 
embracing the new vision. 
Indicators:  Why change?  Believes pre-change structure sufficient in satisfying 
needs of DoD.  Displays no sense of urgency, disagrees with the need for 
realignment.   
 
Exclusion:  Apathetic, uniformed, egocentric.   8 








Examples:  “…it was unnecessary.”  “not…the first realignment we have had 
over the years…”“…life goes on much as it did before.”   “…a minority of the 
faculty…thought some changes were needed.”   “…have a pleasant time at PG 
school, you’ll go there for three years and then you’ll leave and nothing will 
have changed.”  “I definitely don’t think it was necessary from my perspective.”   




Definition:  Individual feels part of the process, part of the organization, has a 
say or is involved in facilitating the realignment either indirectly by doing a 
good job or directly as a change agent from a position of formal or informal 
authority.  The realignment has enhanced both formal and informal 
organizational relationships and communication among individuals at various 
levels within the organization.   
Indicators:  Unity toward common good of the school, played a role in the 
change process, able to influence the change in his/her own way, feelings of 
empowerment, change has improved or increased interdisciplinary relationships. 
Exclusion:  Evaluation of overall change process, agreement with vision 
9 
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Examples:    “…I have interacted…and been involved.”    “…I proposed a major 
reorganization of the whole division.”   “I was on the committee,”  “empowered 
process ownership,” “People are thinking a bit more broadly,”  “well connected 
with other departments.” 
Definition: Understanding the need to change and remain relevant agreement 
with the Superintendent, market and promote the institution abroad. Includes 
dollar conscious (fiscal responsibility), necessary decision to preserve the 
existence of the school and a need for interdisciplinary studies/differentiation 
from civilian universities.  Believes that the organization is moving in the right 
direction.  Instilled a sense of urgency within the organization. 
Indicators:  The corporate “university concept” mentioned in positive context, 
individual possesses the big picture, supportive of long term goals.  A sense of 
urgency is present with expressed relief or gladness that the institution is moving 
forward.  Mention of “win-win” situation, restating the vision for change in 
positive context, agreement with the Superintendent’s leadership style, actions, 
or correct communication and implementation of vision. 
Exclusion:  This does not cite examples of observed behavior of interdisciplinary 
applications, only agreement that the vision is a positive change and the 
leadership was correctly applied. 
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• Corporate University 
• Restatement of Vision 
• Effective Leadership 
Examples:  “…each of the institutes is aligned….with some part of the navy’s 
war fighting organization structure,”  “buy in with the general vision,”  “Its time 
to reinvigorate the place,” “the need for change was correctly perceived,”  “the 
Superintendent saw very clearly and I think communicated that pretty 
effectively,”  “it was very critical that he grab the bull by the horns and go 
forward.” 
Definition:  Blinkered, insular point of view; showing little concern for 
overarching institutional goals; individual needs or field of study are more 
important to this person, selfishness - main concern is with self-
gratification/research, short-sighted viewpoint. 
Indicators:  Apathy, indifference, serving personal needs. Inward-focused, 
connotes “individual or individualism,” constant reference or use of “I” where a 
team effort or “we” could have been used.  No initiative to become involved in 
the organization or processes, disinterest or avoiding participation.  Almost 
outright apathetic towards the change.  . 
Exclusion:  Statements of fact. 
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Examples:   “I don’t care.”   “It doesn’t affect me.”   “I try to stay insulated from 
that and stay out of the inevitable tension between the faculty and 
administration…”   “…I’m indifferent.”    “…it was a hassle to the people 






• Nothing has changed. 
• No difference 
Definition:  No propensity to change, inconsequential result or effects of change 
initiatives.  No momentum or obvious movement toward changing of values, 
culture, or feelings about vision. Organizational relationships have remained the 
same. 
Indicators:  The individual is expressing a factual observation to the best of 
his/her knowledge. No affects in role or behavior noticed.  Negligible 
differences regarding organizational efforts to change or adapt.  A simple 
statement conveying that attempts to transform or change the organization have 
not affected internal relationships - formal or informal.   
Exclusions:  Apathy.  Indifference.  Strong feelings of optimism or pessimism. 
Examples:    “I think life goes on much as it did before”   “I don’t think the 
realignment really has any affect on them [values].”  “I don’t think that’s 







Rules for applying the code: 
 
1. The sentence will be the smallest unit of coding.   
2. All responses do not necessitate application of the code. 
3. The code will not be applied to interview questions. 
4. Coders will make every effort to preserve continuous thoughts within responses.  
Responses will be coded with the intention of capturing the entire thought from 
the interviewee unless a specific keyword or indicator appears as in rule #5. 
5. If a paragraph contains text which specifically states a keyword, indicator or very 
clearly articulates the theme literally, it will be coded unless context determines it 
irrelevant. 
6. Paragraphs or responses from the interviewee will be treated as the basis for new 
thoughts.  Although themes may appear more than once in a single response, it 
must represent a new thought in order to apply more than one coding instance. 
Transitions in thought represent appropriate instances to apply more than one 
theme within the response.   
7. In cases where the interviewee is conveying a continuous thought and interrupts 
or mentions a specific comment, which must be coded as described in rule #5, the 
entire response or paragraph will be “double-coded” as one thought in addition to 
the specific instance mentioned.  
8. Coders should refrain from coding implications or perceptions unless the response 
explicitly states or captures the interviewee’s feelings as described in the code.  
Assumptions or implications without specific mention of keywords or indicators 
will not break a continuous thought or expression by the interviewee and thus will 
not be coded or double-coded. 
9. When attempting to code each response, the coder should pay specific attention to 
the nature and intent of the interviewer’s question.  This will assist the coder in 




















Additional Coding Notes:   
 
THEME 1:  Lack of Confidence in Leadership 
1. This includes outright disagreement with the vision based on LEADERSHIP 
context:  failure or resistance to the change because of the leadership. 
2. Lack of faith more describes competence or loss of confidence in NPS leadership 
– ignore outside pressures and entities.   
3. Include Deans or other individuals referred to as weak or exercising poor 
leadership. 
 
THEME 2:  Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution 
1. Easily confused with “Simpatico with Vision.” 
2. This could be confused with Anxiety because it can be linked to concern.  
However, context will denote an expression of pride, protection of territory vs. 
true apprehension about the future or external pressures from senior Navy 
leadership. 
 
THEME 3:  Authoritative Positional Power and Control 
1. This theme is focused solely and squarely upon the Superintendent’s leadership 
style particularly the forced-micromanaging and unreceptive behavior 
demonstrated in disseminating his vision throughout the organization.  
 
THEME 4:  Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals 
1. Possible confusion between cultural conflict due to poorly designed 
organizational process linkages with compensation and intended outcomes.  
Specifically the design of institutes and lack of congruence in developing and 
implementing the matrix organization in which academics are encouraged to form 
relationships and conduct research to ensure annual compensation. 
 
THEME 5:  Anxiety toward the Process of Change and External Pressures 
1. If anxiety appears in affecting institutional relationships code this as Theme 5 
2. If references to the external environment, only code this if “worry, apprehension, 
concern” are precisely mentioned. 
 
THEME 6:  Lack of Personal or Positional Power 
1. From the aspect of “power” – the ability to influence decisions, events, etc.  This 
refers to personal views of the individual and his/her place in the organization. 
 
THEME 7:  Cultural Conflict 
1. Any use of “academic” culture or ways of doing things or comparison between 






THEME 8:  Satisfaction with Status Quo 
1. Disagreement with the vision is based on INSTITUTIONAL context: change is 
unnecessary because of environmental factors – not leadership.  This conveys 
satisfaction even if not directly. 
2. This theme is present in those who disagree and are happy or prefer the current 
situation.  Not necessarily displaying egocentric traits of academia. 
 
THEME 9:  Institutional Process Ownership - Sense of Shared Purpose 
1. This is NOT agreement with the vision – that is simpatico!   
2. Any evidence of interrelationships or feeling like he/she played a role in the 
change 
 
THEME 10:  Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment 
1. The individual is clearly conveying his/her agreement with the vision for 
realignment 
2. The individual identifies with the Superintendent’s strategy and tactics for 
enacting change – views this as effective or goal oriented.  
3. Any restatement of the vision in a positive context 
 
THEME 11:  Academic Insularity / Egocentricity 
1. These are personal views or feelings conveyed – not factual or observations.   
2. Avoid statements of fact or mere observations such as, “my role really hasn’t 
changed” or “how I do my job, almost nothing has changed.” 
 
THEME 12:  Organizational Inertia  
1. This is an observation similar to stating fact.
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